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1SOC IAL RESPONS IB I L I TY AND THE MODERN
CORPORAT ION
The previous two decades have seen an explosion of shareholder-sponsored
proposals in US firms, even though the phenomenon isn’t concentrated ex-
clusively in North America. Shareholder engagement has also been on the
rise in Europe, with firm owners proving active in Annual General Meet-
ings and engaging more often and on a wide range of topics with firm
management (Pardo and Valli, 2014). This corporate governance tool allows
the shareholder—the owner of the company—to initiate corporate action
on various issues. It thus provides shareholders with a formal mechanism
through which they can raise concerns about corporate governance, as well
as the social and environmental performance of firms.
Beginning with the 1990s the increase in shareholder proposals submit-
ted to a vote has also been accompanied with a growth in the votes cast in
favor of the proposals (Thomas and Cotter, 2007; Gillan and Starks, 2007).
Another intriguing development is the emergence of institutional investors
as major equity holders in financial markets. This new position has led them
to switch from a traditional passive shareholder role towards a more active
role. Since these investors’ holdings are often large, they cannot easily sell
their shares in underperforming companies without driving the price down.
Also, because the performance of portfolio managers in financial institutions
is often compared to a benchmark, managers have an incentive to hold onto
their portfolios. This in turn increases their incentives to undertake manage-
ment monitoring and control via the mechanism of shareholder proposals
(i.e. shareholder engagement), instead of simply relying on the monitoring
functions of the stock market itself or those of the takeover market.
These changes take place within the broader context of the ongoing de-
bate on the social responsibility of firms. At heart, this debate revolves
around the normative question of what the firm should do.1
1 When considering the firm from a narrow “collection of contracts” perspective, in their seminal
paper Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the behavior of a firm is akin to the behavior of
a market, namely the outcome of a complex equilibrium process. As such it would be an
error to think about organizations as if they were persons (or individuals) with motivations
and intentions, rendering misleading questions to the effect of “does the firm have a social
responsibility”. We believe this to be a false equivalence.
Markets are often limited in the scope of their activities (largely setting prices and ownership
transfers) and—unless oligopolistic—individual contracting parties are often too small to exert
a dominating influence on the market itself. Corporations, on the other hand, are almost always
defined by significant asymmetries among contracting parties, whereas top management can
exert a dominating influence on the direction of the firm (e.g. much bigger than that of a
company clerk).
Firms also have a wide range of (stakeholder-affecting) activities at their disposal that can re-
flect both motivation and intention, like launching safe (unsafe) or high-quality (low-quality)
products, initiating (or not) health initiatives aimed at its workforce, considering (or not) com-
munity concerns when developing a new site, actively promoting (or not) gender equality
and overall diversity in senior positions, internalizing (or not) negative externalities, limiting
(or not) emissions beyond legal obligations, engaging with NGOs to address public policy
concerns (or fighting them), advocating (or not) for favorable regulatory or political changes,
etc. Having important discretionary powers within their contracts, such decisions are often
within the direct remit of senior managers, which are individuals with distinct motivations and
intentions. And, indeed, normative questions revolving around the nature of the firm keep
appearing in one form or another in academic discussions (e.g. Renneboog et al., 2008), Tirole
(2001) in particular encouraging scientific debate on these issues.
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The traditional perspective is based on the ideas of Adam Smith, namely
the invisible hand of the market. According to this view the selfish pursuit
of individual self-interest allows corporations to seek and achieve efficiency
when operating in a free-market economy. Proponents of this world-view
(e.g. Friedman, 1970) point out that this is a most efficient framework for
creating wealth: conducting business with a selfish pursuit of individual
self-interest; treating profit maximization as a normative goal; operating in
free and competitive markets; and having a minimalist public policy.
Such conditions provide economic agents with incentives to innovate, cut
costs and prices, produce products and services with economic value added,
and generate capital for future investments. The invisible hand of the mar-
ket is thus believed to foster a non-zero-sum game, with the firms’ selfish
pursuit of self-interest conspiring not only to create wealth and enrich the
owners, but also to generate better economic performance across the board.
In this context it is assumed that there is generally no conflict between so-
ciety and firms, meaning that what is in the interest of the firm is also in the
interest of society at large. Milton Friedman goes as far as suggesting that
“the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits”, even though
this naturally relies on Pigovian state intervention to correct market failures.
Any issues arising from business activities ought thus to be regulated away
by politics.
When markets fail, in the spirit of Pigou (1920) the state can correct mar-
ket inefficiencies, either by regulating the negative externalities that firms
impose on society; or by redistributing income and wealth, since markets
can result in an unequal distribution of wealth that would be unacceptable
with respect to society’s moral standards and expectations.
In this world-view there is thus this implicit assumption that the private
and the public spheres are completely separated, business being a private
activity only restricted by law and with no responsibility other than to make
profits and create wealth (and with no bearing on regulation). While the
public good is pursued exclusively by politics (without any influence from
private businesses), or created as a by-product of free markets and free-
enterprise.
While traditional economic thinking has revolved around the precepts of
shareholder-value maximization since the eighteenth century (Smith, 1776),
in recent decades sections of the literature have been challenging this line
of thought and investigating alternatives to it (e.g. Tirole, 2001). The share-
holder-value approach suggests that firms should be maximizing profits for
their shareholders, while all other stakeholders would be protected by con-
tracts and regulation. The state is responsible for setting-up redistributive
taxation meant to correct market-induced inequalities. Thus according to
Pigovian principles, it is the state that should correct market failures and in-
come or wealth inequalities, and not individual citizens nor the firms them-
selves.
But just as there are market failures concerning externalities and wealth
distribution, so too there are regulatory failures. On a fundamental level,
laws are imperfect and their effects are limited. Laws are in their essence
Interestingly, some jurisdictions legally recognize the right to free speech of corporations, as
associations of individuals, including on political matters (see the 2010 US Supreme Court
decision in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission). As reported by The Economist at the
time, “Lawyers for Citizens United argue that companies have a constitutional right to use
their economic power to play whatever role they want to in the political process, under the
same constitutional right to free speech enjoyed by every American citizen.” (The Economist,
2009) The plaintiff’s main argument, accepted by the court, relied fully on corporations having
motivations and intentions, just as individual persons do.
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rough guidelines to what constitutes appropriate, ethical behavior conform-
ing to society’s (current) moral standards. Moreover, laws are not always
systematically enforced: A law (or constitution) not enforced may be—for
the intents and purposes of guiding human or firm behavior—irrelevant.
A straightforward modern-life example comes from the illegal download-
ing and sharing of multimedia over the internet. Downloading a movie from
the internet—without paying royalties to copyright holders and without
their explicit authorization—is without doubt a simple act of stealing. And
while many people would generally abhor the idea of shoplifting a DVD,
they seem to be having little qualms to grab a copy when it comes with the
ease of a click of a button, even if the two acts are indeed largely equivalent
(i.e. illegally obtaining a copy of a given work). In this instance enforcement
credibility is the driving factor, insofar people often have a reasonable expec-
tation of not getting caught in the comfort and relative safety of their houses
and away from prying eyes, and thus of not facing the potential undesired
consequences of their behavior. This being human nature and since firms
are run by humans, corporations too will often push the limits of the law
until they find the enforcement standards as practiced by the authorities.
Ultimately this will reflect regulatory failure.
In addition to enforcement practices sometimes trumping black-on-white
written rules, laws can simply become outdated by virtue of technological or
social changes, leading to selective enforcement of laws by the authorities.
An old law still on the books, but contravening to the prevailing ethical
norms in the society, shall be deliberately ignored and flouted by individuals
and authorities alike. Real-life is littered with such examples, and it is for
these reasons that new laws constantly get introduced, while old laws get
amended and sometimes abrogated.
One high-profile example of an old law with no relevance to modern soci-
ety is a regulation from 17 November 1800 in Paris, France, banning women
from wearing pants without explicit permission from the police2. While this
law has been on the books and officially in force for the best part of the past
two centuries, in recent decades it has been—obviously—systematically ig-
nored across the board by individuals as well as authorities. Curiously, the
abrogation of this law on 31 January 2013 was justified by its incompatibility
with the Preamble of the French Constitution of 1946 (among other texts),
meaning that even if incompatible, for more that half a century this text had
carried the full weight of the law and should have been observed uncondi-
tionally by both ordinary citizens and the police, as it was never officially
declared null and void by the competent authorities. One can only wonder
how many such rules exist in various jurisdictions that no longer have any
practical, social or moral relevance, yet nominally still bear the full force and
authority of the law.
An obvious question arises then: While there is no controversy across the
academic spectrum that firms are indeed expected to follow the law, does
society truly expects firms to blindly follow all laws, however flawed or
morally inadequate? Or is it expected of firms in some cases to exercise a
certain degree of discretion as to which laws have practical, social or moral
relevance, especially in laxly regulated regimes? The latter would implicitly
invalidate the traditional stance of firms limiting themselves to a simple
economic role.
As it becomes clear from these examples, it is neither possible nor conve-
nient for governments to regulate everything in business life. Laws simply
2 http://www.senat.fr/questions/base/2012/qSEQ120700692.html
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cannot exhaustively define all aspects of how business should be conducted
today and forever in the future, and enforcement is never perfect. For in-
stance, governments have a long history of being slow to adequately regu-
late technological advancements (e.g. privacy concerns over internet-based
services). More confusing still, old laws (and constitutional provisions) may
be subject to significant reinterpretation by the courts, mirroring ethical
shifts within society.
There are a number of other reasons as to why governments may fail
in their regulatory attempts. One aspect is that the factual separation of
political and economic power—an assumption implicitly present in the tra-
ditional shareholder-value approach—is doubtful. The economic and finan-
cial might of businesses may naturally and unduly influence the regulator
to at least partly satisfy their vested interests. The “capture” by lobbies,
the wealthy or other interest groups may lead rule-makers to fail to appro-
priately address market failures, as Pigovian principles would demand, by
failing to correct negative externalities or distributional inequalities. This
serves to highlight just how much economic agents do not limit themselves
to a strict economic role.
Another issue plaguing regulators is the territoriality of their jurisdiction
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). For instance, the US or EU regulator can have
very little sway over building safety in a distant, sovereign country. And any
given government could hardly enforce local legislation banning child labor
in a different country. The modern ease and speed of travel means that
nowadays firms will often span several countries and jurisdictions when
producing a single unit of a particular final good. This puts many govern-
ments in an impossible position if they wished to ensure that goods and ser-
vices commercialized within their jurisdiction have indeed been produced
throughout the chain in conformance with local laws and moral standards.
And last, states are generally monolithic structures and suffer from a com-
bination of inefficiency, high transaction costs, poor information and high
delivery costs (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). As such the state isn’t necessarily
well suited for policing and addressing minor nuisances such as a lack of
respect for the employees or the impact of a new business on a small local
community.
In addition to the above, regulatory failure may stem from the hetero-
geneous preferences of economic agents. Some constituencies may want to
promote values not (yet) shared by law-makers, hence not fully reflected in
on-going regulatory efforts.
On this backdrop there is a new trend of increasing demands from society
and law-makers alike for individual and corporate social responsibility as
an alternative response to market and redistributive failures (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2010). There are numerous signs to this effect. According to data from
the Social Investment Forum (2012), the value of assets under management
(AUM) in the US that fall into the SRI category accounted for 11% of total
assets under professional management, for an estimated $3.7 trillion AUM.
Other signs include the proliferation of fair-trade products covering a
large array of products, from coffee to hand-crafted jewelry. Nowadays most
large companies produce yearly reports on their activities concerning social
responsibility, while others create new positions such as a Chief Sustainabil-
ity Officer. In the past couple of decades various governments have launched
efforts to curb environmental pollution, one high-profile result being the
creation of markets for carbon offsets (e.g. the EU Emission Trading Scheme
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Figure 1: A billboard encouraging responsible water consumption in a residential
area of Toulouse, France.
from 2005). Whereas many companies are now looking into designing prod-
ucts with 100% end-of-life recycling in mind (e.g. Airbus).
In industrialized democracies individuals are nowadays expected to con-
tribute to the recycling effort, ranging from paper to electronic products,
with purpose bins in use in many big cities. Governments too are generally
supportive of attempts to educate the population on good recycling prac-
tices via purpose-built websites such as www.consignesdetri.fr (in France).
At the same time, a growing majority of products and their packaging fea-
ture indications (and sometimes explicit instructions) on their suitability for
recycling.
Rationing water consumption is another area in which both governments
and individual citizens take a stand. Even in countries without noticeable
water shortages, such as France, authorities will actively encourage its pop-
ulation to avoid wasting fresh water (see Figure 1). Numerous establish-
ments across the world, from airports to university dormitories, invest in
technologies that help prevent wasting water (e.g. self-stopping water taps
and showers). In regions that do experience severe water shortages, like Cal-
ifornia in the US or Mexico, efforts to address water consumption will be
omnipresent. For example in California many buildings or products will fea-
ture labels extolling the water-saving qualities of the technologies involved,
such as waterless urinals in airports.
In the same spirit, energy consumption is at the forefront of the sustain-
ability debate these days. The past decade has seen a mini revolution coming
from an old technology: light-emitting diodes, commonly known as LEDs.
This technology has seen a bewildering number of new and modern con-
sumer products designed to replace antiquated (and wasteful) technologies
such as incandescent light bulbs (and even neon and fluorescent lighting).
A related development concerns energy utilities. Nowadays, utility com-
panies may actively encourage its users to consume less. While traditional
economic intuitions would suggest that in a free-market, profit-maximizing
agents would seek to sell more to consumers, some energy distributors will
provide detailed instructions to their customers on how to consume less.
For instance Direct Énergie SA, a publicly traded electric utility in France
not owned by the Government3, has a prominent section on its website for
household consumers detailing various strategies on reducing daily energy
3 http://groupe.direct-energie.com/qui-sommes-nous/notre-organisation/actionnariat/
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consumption and even recommendations for specific energy-efficient tech-
nologies4.
There is also a marked increase in demand for renewable energy technolo-
gies, as evidenced among other things by generous government subsidies in
many industrialized democracies. After the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear dis-
aster in 2011, both Japan and Germany—two leading industrial and techno-
logical powerhouses—have announced bold plans on reducing their reliance
on nuclear energy and increasing the share of renewables in the energy mix.
Transitioning large, industrialized economies to a different energy mix that
comes with its own constraints and drawbacks is bound to prove a messy
and trial and error process, however many economies are already going
through the first phases.
While for various reasons the technology still lags behind in efficiency
and cost, among other drawbacks, there is clearly a big push from policy
makers towards reliance on renewables in the mid- to long-term future. Fur-
thermore the industry as well as the academia oversees significant research
and development aiming to make the relevant technology more efficient,
such as more thermally stable and higher capacity batteries (including ex-
otic solutions such as wood- or virus-based batteries) or photovoltaic cells
performing well under diffuse light (e.g. in cloudy countries like Germany
or the UK, or even performing indoor with artificial light sources). More
importantly, engineers are working towards making the technological solu-
tions commercially viable and thus suitable for mass production.
A well-known example nicely exhibits how these issues are currently per-
vading the collective mindset. In 2005 General Electric, an American multi-
national conglomerate, has launched an environmental initiative called Eco-
magination, which included identifying energy savings in its daily operations
as well as research and development in clean technologies. While the busi-
ness case argument was necessarily one of the main selling points of the
program, there can be little doubt that Ecomagination was partly designed
to appeal to the disparate stakeholders of the company, from regulators to
individual consumers, to show that GE was taking seriously their diffuse
concerns. Whereas GE is not the only company in the world to have an-
nounced far-reaching environmental initiatives, this goes to highlight how
sustainability has entered public consciousness and induces firms to take a
stance on these issues.
Another aspect that government cannot possibly regulate is the lifestyles
of individual citizens. With the advent of the welfare state in the 20th century,
generally accompanying the process of industrialization and democratiza-
tion, governments have resorted evermore to nationwide health insurance
schemes. While this has the unambiguous effect of increasing total welfare
in the society, it also means that general trends towards worsening health
become a budgetary headache for the government (and by extension, via
taxation, to the society as a whole). Even if governments can have regu-
latory sway on some aspects (e.g. reduce smoking via vigorous taxation),
they will have little say on, for instance, how much people eat or how of-
ten they exercise. What they can do, however, is to unambiguously express
demand for individual responsibility via prominently advertised initiatives
like www.mangerbouger.fr (in France), that encourage people to lead healthy
lifestyles.
All these developments can be viewed from the perspective of the long
and arduous democratic process. It has generally accompanied industrializa-
4 http://particuliers.direct-energie.com/mieux-consommer/tous-mes-conseils/
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tion in the past two centuries, and has seen the denunciation and the end of
slavery along with the granting of “universal” human rights (including basic
freedoms such as the liberty of conscience) as well as the progressive insti-
tutionalization of tolerance towards once-marginalized groups (e.g. formal
recognition of homosexual couples; the interdiction to discriminate based
on sex, race, religious beliefs, etc.; or “universal” adult suffrage, eventually
extended to include women). Society’s growing demands for public account-
ability have undoubtedly contributed to the establishment of democratic
institutions, and one of the latest iterations in this process comes with the
empowerment of civil society (often via non-governmental organizations) as
well as the equitable-trade and responsible-investing movements (Bénabou
and Tirole, 2010). As such, there is unmistakable demand for accountability
of institutions and organizations powerful enough to affect the daily lives
of ordinary citizens, and after the milestones of human rights declarations,
accountable bureaucracies and democratic elections, accountable corpora-
tions are in many ways the next logical step in Western-style, free-market
democracies.
There are several factors that explain this new trend demanding public
corporate accountability. One is that social responsibility is probably a nor-
mal good, and it can certainly be viewed as a natural continuation of the
wider social and ethical shifts happening in industrialized democracies. An-
other would be the speed at which information travels nowadays, and the
instantaneous visibility that this brings to corporations. This effect is not
only limited to corporations, but also to regulators and their response. This
means that corporate action (as well as regulatory response) is often sub-
ject to immediate public scrutiny, and firms find it more difficult to secretly
flout the law or social conventions without risking public repercussions (e.g.
consumer boycotts or class actions). For instance, the frequency of recent vol-
untary car recalls (e.g. 2015 has seen tens of millions of cars recalled in the
US over defective airbags) could be partly explained by this phenomenon.
In addition to the ease of travel of information, the ease of travel of people
and merchandise (accompanied by an incredible ease and low cost of long-
distance communications, either by telephone, email or internet) means that
multinationals now have the means to produce the final goods across a mul-
titude of countries. Keeping in pace with globalization, the scope of external-
ities imposed by multinationals has expanded, especially in less developed
and more laxly regulated countries. And last, the general public is more
aware of the issues surrounding pollution and resource depletion, and their
long-term cost to the society.
On a more fundamental level, however, ethics is deeply embedded in
business. While the idea that economic agents are by nature (ruthless and
selfish) profit-maximizers has gained widespread acceptance among both
practitioners and academics, the reality is that corporations do not maxi-
mize profits in a vacuum. There are numerous ways to maximize profits,
including organized crime and even war, yet this is hardly what economists
have in mind when making the profit-maximizing assumption in economic
models. Even one of the biggest critics of the notion that companies would
have a “social” responsibility, Milton Friedman, will admit that businesses
are required to conform to what society expects of them: “. . . make as much
money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both
those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”
In a society based on the rule of the law, a new company doesn’t simply
spontaneously arise. One must approach the relevant authorities and ask for
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permission to operate, often under a restrictive mandate explicitly defining
the scope of the firm’s activities, and all under the expectation that the new
business would create jobs and generate new products or services useful
for society, along with paying taxes. What is more, a firm doesn’t conduct
business in a vacuum, but operates strictly within a community. Firms will
always necessarily take advantage of preexisting infrastructure that society
provides them with. This concerns a wide variety of tangible and intangible
elements, ranging from roads, bridges, ports, airports, cities, shops, residen-
tial areas, utilities (electricity, water, heat), communications (mail, telephone,
internet) and emergency services (police, hospitals, firefighters) to a skilled,
educated and healthy workforce, the rule of law (which mostly ensures a
standardized rulebook for all), institutionalized rights like intellectual prop-
erty or private property (crucial to a functioning free-market economy) and
courts (entrusted to ensure that the rulebook is internally consistent, and
enforced as uniformly as humanly possible)—all elements without which
a majority of modern-day corporations couldn’t possibly set up shop and
activate the way they do now. Even in cases in which businesses are located
“in the middle of nowhere” (e.g. mines set up in remote locations or oil
platforms), corporations are still fully dependent on access to centralized,
government-provided infrastructure for daily operations as well as for ac-
cess to customers.
Viewed from this perspective, and without even touching on the argument
of resource depletion, firms owe quite a great deal to society for allowing
them to maximize profits within its midst. Or as Barack Obama, the US
President, eloquently put it in a now-famous 2012 speech: “If you’ve got a
business—you didn’t build that. Somebody else made that happen.”
To take a simplified view on the matter, society chooses to give firms a
license to operate within the community, with all the advantages that it en-
tails, under the necessary condition that firms follow the rules of the game.
Most of the rules are codified into laws and regulations, however society
may deem these to not be sufficient. When this happens, society may choose
to encourage firms to play more “nicely” than the rules require them to. This
may happen for instance via consumer choices (either positive or negative),
lobbying (NGOs) or even litigation (class action), which may subsequently
spur such phenomena as corporate social responsibility (CSR). If more dras-
tic measures are needed or encouragements prove ineffective, laws can and
do get changed by elected representatives, resulting in more stringent and
constraining regulations. If corporations perceive regulatory threats as cred-
ible, this too may spur CSR. This process is ultimately a reflection of the
growing empowerment of civil society—which traces its roots to the end
of institutionalized serfdom and slavery, and the advent of democratic ex-
pression (i.e. generalized enfranchisement)—, allowing it to effect change
within the constraints of the system. If society feels that corporations should
contribute more explicitly to the public good, for instance by internalizing
or avoiding negative externalities, or by intelligently using and reusing fi-
nite resources, it has the legitimacy and the means to achieve such goals
(even if the process may prove long-drawn-out and progressive).
It is fairly obvious that society reserves the right to change the rules of
the game (i.e. the laws) in response to corporate abuses of societal good-
will, in which cases corporate legitimacy itself may be challenged. The Sar-
banes–Oxley Act of 2002 in the US was passed in reaction to a number of
major corporate and accounting scandals, including Enron and Worldcom.
Some of the act’s provisions (i.e. mandating that top management certify
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and bear individual responsibility for the accuracy and completeness of fi-
nancial reports, adding criminal penalties for certain misconduct, imposing
stronger and more independent audit committees, etc.) ultimately reflect
the public’s demand for more corporate accountability. The effects of those
events weren’t confined to the USA, as similar laws were passed in other
countries such as the 2003 “Loi de sécurité financière” in France or the “Cor-
porate Law Economic Reform Program Act 2004” in Australia.
Social responsibility is thus a means for individual citizens and corpora-
tions to empower themselves and substitute for elected government (Bén-
abou and Tirole, 2010). In response to these social pressures, the notion of
corporate social responsibility (CSR) has gained traction with governments,
practitioners and academics alike. Traditionally CSR can be defined as being
about sacrificing profits in the social interest, meaning that a firm would vol-
untarily choose to go beyond its legal and economic responsibilities in order
to behave prosocially. This necessarily implies that companies partly aban-
don their traditional, narrowly defined economic role.
Taking a moral stance on various issues is notoriously difficult for compa-
nies, as it may force them into uneasy tradeoffs between economic and social
responsibilities. This is especially a conundrum for multinational companies,
which regularly find themselves navigating the shifting sands of disparate
ethical norms arising from heterogeneous communities across the world.
Different cultural and economic conditions will naturally generate legal and
ethical dilemmas for firms with transnational operations.
A fine example of this phenomenon constitutes Arla Foods, a Danish
producer of dairy products, caught out by the PR mayhem that followed
the publication of satirical cartoons of the prophet Muhammad in Jyllands-
Posten, a Danish newspaper, in 2006 (see Ettenson et al., 2012). Experienc-
ing a debilitating boycott of its products in the Middle East markets, the
company found itself stuck between liberal and free-speech social pres-
sures coming from European constituencies, and conservative and protec-
tive of religion social pressures fromMiddle-Eastern constituencies, a divide
seemingly impossible to bridge for the firm. With vanishing sales in the af-
fected markets (from a $430m annual level in the region), the company was
forced into an uncharacteristic public apology for the cartoons. This in turn
sparked controversy back in Denmark, and earned it fresh calls for boycotts,
ironically for opposite reasons. This also goes to show how firms, whether
willingly or not, aren’t necessarily politically-neutral agents, and find them-
selves needing to cater to their constituencies.
More generally, the CSR phenomenon can be seen as a call for ethical self-
restraint and prosocial behavior, encouraging businesses to refrain from spe-
cific behaviors in their quest to maximize profits. Thus CSR can be loosely
described as being about “how managers should handle public policy and
social issues” (Windsor, 2006). More formally, Heal (2005) defines CSR as
corporate “actions which reduce the extent of externalized costs or avoid
distributional conflicts”. As such, it encompasses a broad spectrum of po-
tential activities affecting stakeholders like employees, the environment or
the communities in which the firm operates, or even the mere act of actively
considering ethics in day-to-day business decision-making. Investors or, in
some instances, even competitors can also be thought of as being stakehold-
ers of the firm.
Taking a moral stance and identifying what is societally expected of them
is often uncharted territory for firms, and very hard to pin down. Yet more
and more companies do that. Only recently in 2015, South African Airways,
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has decided to ban the transportation of hunted animal trophies on its air-
craft. The shooting of lions bread in captivity on ranches—also known as
canned hunting, the equivalent of the proverbial “shooting fish in a bar-
rel”—is a growing business in South Africa, and a lucrative one for an airline
charged with transporting the carcasses back to the tourist’s home country.
Yet even so the South African carrier decided to forgo business on ethical
grounds, even if it was at the time in financial distress. This move mirrored
Australia’s 2015 ban on importing trophy kills, which neatly showcases how
a legal business practice may prove unpalatable to the public at large and
thus invite corporate or public policy response.
Another intriguing example comes from Anglo American, a multinational
mining company. Its South African mining operations have long been af-
fected by spreading HIV infections and employees falling ill with AIDS. Not
helping matters was high-level ignorance, exemplified by the then South
African president Thabo Mbeki publicly promoting dangerously wrong the-
ories about HIV not causing AIDS, or his successor, Jacob Zuma, publicly
suggesting after-sex showering as a means to prevent HIV infections. Faced
with public policy failures and skilled workers falling ill and slowly dying,
mining companies resorted to training two people for each critical job at
each mine, to always have a backup when one fell ill, hence leading to an
obvious loss of productivity and efficiency.
In 2002 the firm’s management took the decision to instead tackle the is-
sue from a public policy perspective, providing HIV testing for all employ-
ees who wanted it as well as free treatment—including expensive antiretro-
viral drugs—for those who tested positive. This program affected about 1
in every 5 of Anglo American’s South African staff and, notwithstanding
initial concerns and uncertainties, proved successful by markedly reducing
absenteeism and staff turnover. While there is a clear business case rationale
for this approach, for Anglo American executives “in the end it was a moral
decision” (The Economist, 2013). These initiatives have naturally extended
to tackling other medical issues with staff, like obesity and hypertension.
To highlight the human dimension of Anglo American’s decision making,
workers’ families were also offered testing and treatment. At the same time
the program was expanded from the workplace to clinics in towns and vil-
lages near mines, in partnership with AIDS charities. Following their lead,
other firms like SABMiller, a multinational brewing company, have adopted
a similar approach for their workers, and even companies operating in other
countries like India or Malaysia have shown interest in South African busi-
nesses’ experience with tackling AIDS. Interestingly, such corporate initia-
tives have helped to spur public policymakers into changing the country’s
AIDS policy, South Africa’s government now providing free antiretroviral
drugs for critically affected HIV patients.
Reacting to these trends, institutional investors are generally mindful of
the externalities generated by their investments. Reputational concerns (i.e.
the social-image motivation) rank high on their motivation to practice so-
cially responsible investing. As representatives of often large and disparate
constituencies (e.g. pension funds), institutional investors are even more sub-
ject to public scrutiny and increased visibility than other types of investors.
Then there is the issue of the universal owner approach. Since institutional
investors often hold a significant part of the available assets (across the en-
tire market), the financial performance of their portfolio can be directly af-
fected by the externalities coming from the companies in which they invest.
And last, institutional investors are usually interested in the long-term per-
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formance of their investments (i.e. creating economic value in the long-run).
For instance, pension funds may be receiving the first deposits at a given
date, but be liable for the first payments only some 40 years later.
In such cases, focusing on a long-run horizon is imperative. However,
there is a large body of evidence in the finance literature that firms tend to
suffer from short-term bias. And this is often compounded by agency costs.
As shown by Jensen and Meckling (1976), the modern diffuse-ownership
corporation will usually incur agency costs stemming from the separation of
ownership and control. When viewing the firm as a collection of contracting
relationships and assuming a maximizing behavior on the part of all the
individuals, the owners of the firm (i.e. the principal) are confronted with
the difficulty of inducing the manager (i.e. the agent) to behave so as to
maximize the principal’s welfare.
Investing in a publicly held business corporation essentially means vol-
untarily entrusting billions in funds to organizations run by managers, on
the anticipation that managers will operate the firm so that in the future
there will be earnings accruing to the owners (i.e. residual claims on the cor-
poration). Having delegated much of the decision-making concerning the
managing of these funds, the owners will want the agent to make optimal
decisions from the principal’s viewpoint, but this will not always be the
case therefore resulting in agency costs. These costs come in the form of
monitoring and bonding expenditures, as well as a residual loss.
When attempting to align the managers’ interests with their own, owners
will often devise compensation schemes that would correlate with the finan-
cial performance of the firm. Yet such monetary incentives, even when well
structured, can put more weight on short-term performance rather than on
long-term value. Moreover, because of career concerns managers will neces-
sarily prefer focusing on a short-term outlook, since owners decide whether
to keep or change current management at least partly depending on the
recent performance of the firm.
This focus on short-term performance can result in both losing inter-
temporal profits and in imposing negative externalities on the firm’s stake-
holders. For instance, by focusing on maximizing short-term profits, man-
agers may inadvertently reduce the long-term value of the business while
hurting various stakeholders. When a firm decides to increase its short-term
profits by reducing costs at the expense of worker safety or environmental
pollution, it may be forsaking goodwill and generating contingent liabilities
in the future, thus risking costly regulatory intervention, consumer boycotts,
lawsuits and environmental clean-up costs.
It is precisely this observed short-termism from firm management that
makes CSR so appealing to institutional investors, insofar it induces man-
agers to take a long-term approach to maximizing firm value (i.e. inter-
temporal profits). In this sense socially responsible investors (like institu-
tional investors) can be thought of as long-term investors who actively mon-
itor managers and attempt to correct their short-termist tendencies.
Another way to look at the same basic question—why the social respon-
sible behavior of firms appeals to certain investors—is to consider that in-
vestors may be viewing the firm as a channel for expressing their own values
(or that of the constituencies they represent). Some investors may be willing
to sacrifice yield in order to promote social goals, and would thus be in de-
mand of corporations to engage in philanthropy on their behalf, otherwise
known as delegated philanthropy (Bénabou and Tirole, 2010). This applies
to other stakeholders, as well. For example, employees may willingly sacri-
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fice wages so as the firm would advance some social goals on their behalf.
The monetary equivalent of the sacrifice is then effectively passed to stake-
holders at their own demand.
There are various reasons why stakeholders would turn to firms to further
social goals (e.g. transferring income to less-favored populations), instead
of doing it on their own or through charitable organizations, namely infor-
mation and transaction costs. It is likely that the costs of advancing social
goals in the immediate vicinity of a firm are minimized when philanthropy
is effected by the corporations themselves, as they already have intimate
knowledge and a good understanding of the multitude of individual trades
and contracts. For other types of social goals (e.g. refraining from specific be-
haviors, like polluting the environment), the involvement and assistance of
the corporation is imperative. In this case the only other alternative would
be for the government to impose costly and constraining regulations. The
involvement of the corporation is also unavoidable in cases where the firm
can take advantage of its technical expertise and existing business infras-
tructure to provide goods and services to those in need more efficiently (i.e.
more quickly and at a lesser cost) than governments or charities.
In all of these cases the part-owners in the modern diffuse-ownership
corporation will be confronted with one fundamental problem: differences
of opinions. The shareholders will often diverge in what they believe is
the best course of action for the firm. Some shareholders may have little
interest in the firm promoting social goals, while others may disagree on
which specific prosocial behavior to favor. One solution to this unavoidable
problem is firm governance.
The company governance describes the mechanisms of taking and control-
ling strategic decisions in a firm. One such formal mechanism is the annual
general meeting, which allows the shareholders to voice their opinion on
various issues. In addition to voting on resolutions, shareholders may also
submit resolutions to a vote (subject to certain conditions). Even if the votes
are ultimately not binding, the annual general meetings become a place for
shareholders—in their capacity of owners of the firm—to signal to manage-
ment the aspects of the firm’s business activities that is of concern to them.
In the following chapters we examine several aspects surrounding the
issues raised. Chapter 2 studies how firms respond to shareholder engage-
ment on environmental and social topics. Using data on shareholder-spon-
sored proposals in S&P 1500 firms, we investigate whether following a voted
or withdrawn proposal there are changes in the extra-financial performance
of firms in the short or in the long term. Chapter 3 focuses on the dynamics
of voting on shareholder proposals, and specifically looks into how past or
concurrent votes (or withdrawals) on similar issues may affect a vote on a
proposal in the present. And Chapter 4 attempts to quantify whether ESG
information is being incorporated into the financial flows of information.
More specifically, we seek to determine whether financial analysts incorpo-
rate extra-financial information into the financial forecasts.
2SHAREHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND CORPORATE
BEHAVIOR
Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) has been experiencing significant growth
throughout the world beginning with the early 1990s. Several factors have
underpinned its growth, not least growing social awareness and ethical con-
sumerism, various well-publicized corporate scandals and environmental
disasters, as well as a progressively positive regulatory environment. The
growing importance of institutional investors in the market (like pension
funds or insurance funds, organizations often indirectly accountable to vot-
ers) has been accompanied by increasing pressure from governments, non-
governmental organizations and the general public on firms to improve their
extra-financial performance and to better manage their externalities.
Renneboog et al. (2008) highlight several ways in which SRI manifests
itself. The oldest and most basic SRI strategy uses negative screening, the
practice of filtering out specific firms or entire industries based on Environ-
mental, Social and Governance (ESG) criteria. The opposite approach, pos-
itive screening, effectively relies on investing in firms with superior extra-
financial performance. Both approaches can be combined into a more inte-
grated approach of selecting companies based on both negative and positive
screens, often termed “sustainable investing” or “triple bottom line”. The
latest development in socially responsible investing pertains to combining
sustainable investing with shareholder engagement, that is attempts to in-
fluence corporate behavior and policies by way of private negotiations with
management or voting in Annual General Meetings.
The question remains, however, whether SRI, generally, and shareholder
engagement, more specifically, can be effective at inducing changes in cor-
porate behavior. Heinkel et al. (2001) propose a model that focuses on the
impact of exclusionary ethical investing (or negative screening) on firm be-
havior. The authors investigate whether the presence in the market of green
investors can induce changes in firms. By refusing to hold shares of pol-
luting firms, green investors reduce the risk-sharing among non-green in-
vestors and induce a loss of diversification to polluting firms, which would
in turn lead to lower stock prices hence a higher cost of capital for pollut-
ing firms. Polluting firms may opt to become more responsible when the
increased cost of capital exceeds that of responsible firms. The model im-
plicitly assumes that there are limits to arbitrage in financial markets.
Consistent with such theorizing, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) find that
companies operating in the alcohol, tobacco and gambling industries (the so
called “sin” stocks) have historically outperformed the stock market, which
would imply a higher cost of capital for these firms. The evidence suggests
that social norms can have an effect on financial markets, and that norm-
constrained, ethical investors can affect the cost of capital of non-responsible
firms.
Gollier and Pouget (2014) investigate how socially responsible investors
can affect corporate strategy via shareholder engagement, as an alternative
to ’voting with their feet’. The authors show that a large activist investor,
with a long-term perspective and a credible pro-social orientation, can gen-
erate positive abnormal returns by investing in non-responsible firms and
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making them responsible via engagement. The activist investor may then
benefit by reselling part of their shares at a higher price to other socially
responsible investors.
From the literature on shareholder-sponsored proposals, Ertimur et al.
(2010) examine the determinants of implementation of shareholder-sponsored
Governance proposals that have recorded a majority vote, identifying share-
holder pressure (e.g. voting outcome) and the topic of the proposal as key
factors. The authors identify negative labor market consequences for outside
directors when majority vote proposals are not implemented. Thomas and
Cotter (2007) also report that proposals that win a majority vote are increas-
ingly more likely to be implemented. While Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011)
find that the implementation of Governance proposals depends on voting
success, but is affected by managerial entrenchment and rent-seeking.
Instead of analyzing the voting outcomes, Bauer et al. (2015) look into
withdrawn shareholder-sponsored proposals as measures of engagement
success. The authors find that proposals by influential investors are more
likely to be withdrawn. Moreover, institutional ownership is related to the
likelihood of withdrawal when the sponsor is also an institutional share-
holder. The authors also find a negative relation between CEO ownership
and the likelihood of withdrawal, especially for Governance proposals. Im-
portantly, the authors show that withdrawn proposals on Governance topics
can be effective: proposals on executive compensation will have an impact
on future corporate pay practices.
While much of the literature mostly focuses on Governance proposals,
Dyck et al. (2015) investigate specifically environmental and social perfor-
mance of firms while controlling for governance levels. Using extra-financial
scores from the Thomson Reuters ASSET4 platform, the authors find that
institutional ownership is positively associated with environmental and so-
cial commitments, and that higher scores are associated with long-term in-
vestors like pension funds.
This paper investigates how firms respond to shareholder engagement.
The shareholder-sponsored proposals is a governance mechanism that al-
lows shareholders to raise issues with firm management on various envi-
ronmental, social or governance issues that affect firm stakeholders.
Using the data on shareholder-sponsored proposals compiled by RiskMet-
rics for the S&P 1500 universe, we first examine the frequency distributions
of shareholder proposals using loglinear models. We find that proposals on
Environmental or Social topics are more likely to be withdrawn than to go to
a vote, whereas withdrawn proposals are more likely to be on Environmen-
tal or Social topics than on Governance topics. While Individual Investors
are very unlikely to have their proposals withdrawn, Institutional Investors
and Unions, on the other hand, are the most likely. Overall Coordinated Ac-
tivists seem to be very active on Environmental and Social topics. Individual
Investors and Unions, however, focus their efforts mostly on Governance is-
sues, largely ignoring other topics.
When examining the Environmental/Social subset in isolation, we find
that proposals sponsored by Coordinated Activists are more likely to be on
Environmental than on Social topics. And withdrawn proposals are more
likely to have been sponsored by Institutional Investors than by Coordinated
Activists. Unions and Individual Investors have a small presence on these
topics, so it is hard to draw meaningful conclusions on these two groups.
Using data from the KLD database, we next examine the short-term and
long-term changes in extra-financial performance after a voted or with-
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drawn shareholder-sponsored proposal. The submission process may be af-
fected by endogeneity issues (e.g. firms with worse extra-financial perfor-
mance may be more likely to be targeted by shareholders in the first place),
which is why we adopt the two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework under
which we instrument the fact of being targeted by the level of extra-financial
performance and the lagged targeted data from the previous year.
We find that being targeted on both Environmental and Social topics in
the same year is generally associated with improvements in extra-financial
performance, both in the short term (at 2 and 3 years) and in the long term
(at 5 years). This suggests that shareholder engagement on a broad set of
issues is more conducive to changes in the extra-financial performance of
firms. Examining the intensity of shareholder pressure, we find that a higher
number of voted or withdrawn proposals, as well as a higher proportion
of favorable votes in annual general meetings are associated with improve-
ments in the extra-financial performance (in the short term). The findings
are strongest relative to decreases in environmental or social concerns, or
to increases in net environmental or net social performance. The findings
are similar for the aggregate measures of extra-financial performance. For
environmental issues, the fitted models suggest that a low number of with-
drawn and voted proposals (with average voting support of about 10%) are
needed to induce meaningful changes in firms.
2.1 methodology and data
2.1.1 Shareholder-Sponsored Proposals
For this paper we have collected data from several sources. The data on
shareholder-sponsored proposals comes from RiskMetrics. RiskMetrics pro-
vides records of all shareholder-proposals on Environmental, Social and
Governance (ESG) issues filed at annual meetings in S&P 1500 firms. We
have obtained data for years from 1997 to 2011, for a total of 9668 propos-
als. The database includes information on the identity of the firm that has
received a shareholder proposal, the identity of the sponsor, a short descrip-
tion of the proposal, the date of the shareholder’s meeting, and the outcome
of the vote (or, if there was no vote, an indication whether the proposal was
withdrawn or omitted).
When a shareholder has a specific concern with the running of the firm,
they will usually approach the management to propose a change in corpo-
rate practices. If management is unwilling to effect such a policy change,
the shareholder can signal their discontent by publicly submitting a pro-
posal for vote under the Annual General Meeting (AGM). Thus the mere
instance of submitting a proposal represents a public sign of disagreement
between the shareholder and firm management. If the proposal is valid (i.e.
satisfies the legal requirements for this procedure), it will generally proceed
to a vote. However for various reasons managers may not want that all other
firm shareholders vote on a given proposal, in which case they may initiate
private negotiations with the sponsor of the proposal and offer concessions
(e.g. to implement part of the proposal) in exchange for the sponsor with-
drawing the original proposal. If the negotiations are successful and a satis-
factory compromise has been reached, the sponsor will generally withdraw
the proposal. Otherwise, if management refuses to make concessions on the
matter and the proposal is not withdrawn, it will still proceed to a vote in
the AGM, which would indicate that a disagreement is ever so present. For a
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comprehensive discussion of the shareholder-sponsored submission process
in firms see Bauer et al. (2015).
Thus the status of a proposal can be either voted or withdrawn. In this
study we focus exclusively on valid submissions, that is submitted share-
holder-sponsored proposals that were not omitted on technical grounds (e.g.
for failure to satisfy the regulatory requirements set out by the SEC) or dis-
carded for a variety of reasons. In the sections that follow all of the proposals
considered were either subject to a vote or withdrawn.
Following Karpoff et al. (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000), Bauer et al. (2015),
we categorize the proposals into three broad topics: Governance, Environ-
mental and Social. We also group sponsors into four categories: Individual
Investors, Institutional Investors, Coordinated Activists and Unions.
After clean-up and synchronization with KLD (and taking into account
missing data for various characteristics like sponsor type or topic), the Risk-
Metrics database contains about 2/3 Governance proposals and 1/3 Environ-
mental/Social valid proposals submitted (see Table 1).
Panel (1b) shows that of all the submitted proposals, irrespective of their
topic, about 70% go to a vote and the rest are withdrawn by the sponsor.
In relative terms, there are twice as many withdrawn proposals for Envi-
ronmental and Social proposals (41%) compared to Governance proposals
(23%), considerably above the average of 29%. This would suggest that firm
management is more often prepared to negotiate and reach a compromise
on Environmental/Social topics, rather than on Governance topics.
In Panel (1c) we notice that while the voted rates broadly follow the sub-
mitted rate, the share of withdrawn proposals is remarkably lower for Gov-
ernance proposals (55%) and higher for Environmental/Social proposals
(45%) compared to the submitted rates (68% and 32%, respectively).
We can glimpse a similar story frommosaic and association plots (Friendly,
2000) on the two-way contingency table in Panel (1a). These plots provide an
intuitive graphical method for visualizing and exploring contingency tables.
Mosaic plots display the table frequencies by using rectangular “tiles” whose
size is proportional to the cell frequencies. The rectangles can be colored and
shaded according to the residuals from a specified loglinear model, by de-
fault a model of mutual independence. The stronger the shades, the higher
the departure from independence. The legend in this figure will display the
magnitude of the Pearson residuals. Association plots, like mosaic displays,
will similarly indicate deviations from an independence model. Mosaic and
association displays complement traditional goodness-of-fit summary statis-
tics, allowing to discern the exact pattern of lack-of-fit present in the data.
They allow to present relationships from a given contingency table in a more
intuitive manner for the reader.
Figure 2 displays the departures in the data from a model of mutual inde-
pendence. A χ2 test for the null hypothesis of independence of all factors is
strongly rejected, suggesting the presence of an association. For Governance
proposals there is a remarkably smaller number of withdrawn proposals
than it would be expected under independence (i.e. the top-right red tile
in the graph). Whereas for Environmental/Social topics, the opposite holds:
there is a bigger number of withdrawn proposals than expected (i.e. the
bottom-right blue tile).
The association plot in Figure 3 displays the same patterns, all the while
clearly highlighting how Environmental/Social proposals are more likely to
be withdrawn whereas Governance proposals less likely. Conversely, Gover-
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nance proposals are more likely to proceed to a vote, whereas Environmen-
tal/Social proposals are less likely.
Status
voted withdrn All
Governance n 5089 1515 6604
CSR n 1812 1252 3064
All n 6901 2767 9668
(a) Counts
Status
voted withdrn All
Governance RowPct 77 23 100
CSR RowPct 59 41 100
All RowPct 71 29 100
(b) Row percentages
Status
voted withdrn All
Governance ColPct 73.7 54.8 68.3
CSR ColPct 26.3 45.2 31.7
All ColPct 100.0 100.0 100.0
(c) Column percentages
Table 1: Breakdown of shareholder-submitted proposals by broad topics and status.
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Figure 2: Mosaic display of shareholder-submitted proposals by broad topics and
status.
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Figure 3: Association plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by broad topics and
status.
Examining solely the proposals that proceeded to a vote (Table 2), there
are a total of 6901 votes across all the categories, with 3/4 relating to Gov-
ernance proposals and 1/4 to Environmental/Social proposals. The average
voting support for all shareholder-sponsored proposals is 29%. Governance
proposals tend to attract more voting support (35% on average) than Envi-
ronmental/Social proposals (12%).
vote
n ColPct mean median
Governance 5089 73.7 35.4 34.0
CSR 1812 26.3 11.8 8.0
All 6901 100.0 29.2 25.0
Table 2: Voting support in favor of shareholder proposals, by broad topics.
The distribution of the voting support for Environmental/Social propos-
als is positively skewed, as shown in Figure 4. Interestingly, there are only
some 15 instances of voting support at or above 50% for Environmental/-
Social proposals in our entire sample. For Governance proposals, the dis-
tribution of votes is much better behaved. The interquartile range suggests
that the spread of votes for Governance proposals is higher than that for
Environmental/Social proposals.
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Figure 4: Boxplots of voting support by broad topics.
Investigating the breakdown of Environmental and Social proposals (Panel
3b), we notice that there are twice as many Social proposals (23%) as there
are Environmental proposals (9%). However the Environmental and Social
proposals exhibit similar trends, and for instance the withdrawn rates are
very similar for both of them (Panel 3a).
Figure 5 presents the association plot for Table 3, and broadly confirms
these intuitions. We strongly reject the null of independence of all factors,
and there is an unexpectedly high number of withdrawn proposals for both
Environmental and Social topics.
Status
voted withdrn All
Governance RowPct 77 23 100
Environmental RowPct 61 39 100
Social RowPct 58 42 100
All RowPct 71 29 100
(a) Row percentages
Status
voted withdrn All
Governance ColPct 73.7 54.8 68.3
Environmental ColPct 7.7 12.3 9.0
Social ColPct 18.5 32.9 22.7
All ColPct 100.0 100.0 100.0
(b) Column percentages
Table 3: Breakdown of shareholder-submitted proposals by topic and status.
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Figure 5: Association plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by topic and status.
The relative proportion of Environmental and Social proposals that are
submitted is similar to that of proposals that proceed to a vote (8% and 19%,
respectively), as shown in Table 4. The voting support enjoyed by both types
of proposals is very similar at around 12% average and 8% median.
vote
n ColPct mean median
Governance 5089 73.7 35.4 34.0
Environmental 532 7.7 11.5 8.0
Social 1280 18.5 11.9 8.0
All 6901 100.0 29.2 25.0
Table 4: Voting support in favor of shareholder proposals, by topic.
In Figure 6 we see that the distribution of voting support for both types of
shareholder-sponsored proposals exhibit similar spread and positive skew-
ness. All of these trends suggest that Environmental and Social proposals
exhibit similar characteristics and can be studied together in the subsequent
sections.
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Figure 6: Boxplots of voting support for Environmental and Social proposals.
by sponsor type We can also examine the submission patterns for pro-
posals sponsored by different investors (Table 5). In Panel (5a) one will im-
mediately notice that proposals sponsored by Individual Investors have the
lowest rate of all withdrawn proposals (6%). The other types of investors
have relatively similar withdrawal rates for the proposals they sponsor, with
Institutional Investors having the highest rate at 42%. Individual Investors
have the highest proportion of proposals (94%) that go to a vote.
As confirmation of the above, in Panel (5b) we can see that out of all the
withdrawn proposals, those sponsored by Individual Investors represent
only 7%, even if Individual Investors submit more proposals compared to
all other investors (30%).
Figure 7 confirms these intuitions. The null hypothesis for the indepen-
dence of all factors is once more strongly rejected. Proposals sponsored by
Individual Investors are very likely to proceed to a vote, whereas Institu-
tional Investors and Unions have a high likelihood for their proposals to be
withdrawn. Proposals by Activist Investors follow more closely the expected
frequencies.
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Status
voted withdrn All
Institutional RowPct 58.4 41.6 100.0
Activism RowPct 67.1 32.9 100.0
Individual RowPct 93.7 6.3 100.0
Unions RowPct 60.8 39.2 100.0
All RowPct 71.4 28.6 100.0
(a) Row percentages
Status
voted withdrn All
Institutional ColPct 19.7 34.9 24.0
Activism ColPct 19.2 23.5 20.4
Individual ColPct 39.3 6.6 30.0
Unions ColPct 21.8 35.0 25.6
All ColPct 100.0 100.0 100.0
(b) Column percentages
Table 5: Breakdown of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type and status.
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Figure 7: Association plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type and
status.
If we examine the patterns by sponsor type and topics (Table 6), we no-
tice that Institutional and Activist Investors have much higher withdrawn
rates for Environmental/Social proposals (above 50% and 32%, respectively)
than for Governance proposals. These rates are also above the average 29%
of withdrawn proposals for the entire sample. (Unions have too few data
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points on Environmental/Social issues to allow us to draw any meaningful
conclusions.)
Status
voted withdrn All
Institutional Governance RowPct 69.8 30.2 100.0
Environmental RowPct 44.4 55.6 100.0
Social RowPct 49.9 50.1 100.0
All RowPct 58.4 41.6 100.0
Activism Governance RowPct 76.3 23.7 100.0
Environmental RowPct 67.9 32.1 100.0
Social RowPct 62.3 37.7 100.0
All RowPct 67.1 32.9 100.0
Individual Governance RowPct 94.2 5.8 100.0
Environmental RowPct 90.0 10.0 100.0
Social RowPct 86.8 13.2 100.0
All RowPct 93.7 6.3 100.0
Unions Governance RowPct 61.1 38.9 100.0
Environmental RowPct 15.4 84.6 100.0
Social RowPct 60.7 39.3 100.0
All RowPct 60.8 39.2 100.0
(a) Row percentages
Table 6: Breakdown of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type, topic and
status.
Looking at the Environmental and Social subsets individually (Table 7), it
is clear that both Individual Investors and Unions have a very small pres-
ence on these topics, collectively representing less than 10% of the submitted
proposals. An overwhelming majority of Environmental/Social proposals
come from Institutional Investors or Coordinated Activists. (The converse
is that Individual Investors and Unions are mostly active on Governance
topics.)
Institutional Investors have withdrawn rates bigger than their submit-
ted rates on Environmental/Social topics, reflecting their negotiating power
with firm management on these issues. Interestingly, Activist Investors sub-
mit two times more Environmental proposals (59%) than Institutional In-
vestors (33%), highlighting the high-profile of Coordinated Activists on this
topic. On Social issues, the submissions are spread evenly between Institu-
tional and Activist Investors (each with around 45%).
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Status
voted withdrn All
Environmental Institutional ColPct 23.9 46.6 32.8
Activism ColPct 65.6 48.4 58.9
Individual ColPct 10.2 1.8 6.9
Unions ColPct 0.4 3.2 1.5
All ColPct 100.0 100.0 100.0
(a) Column percentages (Environmental subset)
Status
voted withdrn All
Social Institutional ColPct 37.7 53.0 44.0
Activism ColPct 48.6 41.3 45.5
Individual ColPct 9.8 2.1 6.6
Unions ColPct 4.0 3.6 3.8
All ColPct 100.0 100.0 100.0
(b) Column percentages (Social subset)
Table 7: Breakdown of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type and status
for the Environmental and Social subsets.
Examining the voting patterns (Table 8), it is striking that Unions-spon-
sored Environmental proposals that proceed to a vote run in the single dig-
its. For all investor types the average vote for Governance proposals is well
above average voting support for Environmental/Social proposals, mirror-
ing the overall trend. Institutional Investors have the highest voting support
among all the investors, irrespective of the proposal topic (41% for Gover-
nance and 16% for Environmental/Social proposals).
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vote
n ColPct mean median
Institutional Governance 748 10.84 41.32 39.50
Environmental 127 1.84 17.00 9.00
Social 482 6.98 16.15 10.00
All 1357 19.66 30.11 26.80
Activism Governance 355 5.14 25.04 17.00
Environmental 349 5.06 9.90 7.00
Social 622 9.01 9.72 7.00
All 1326 19.21 13.87 8.00
Individual Governance 2535 36.73 34.81 33.00
Environmental 54 0.78 9.05 7.00
Social 125 1.81 7.27 6.00
All 2714 39.33 33.03 30.00
Unions Governance 1451 21.03 35.87 35.30
Environmental 2 0.03 8.90 8.90
Social 51 0.74 10.67 7.50
All 1504 21.79 34.98 34.90
Table 8: Voting support in favor of shareholder proposals by sponsor type and topic.
2.1.1.1 Modeling the Dynamics of the Submission Process
In addition to the intuitions glimpsed from the examination of the marginal
relationships above, we can rely on loglinear models to more formally model
the dynamics of the submission process and the trends in the outcomes of
shareholder-sponsored proposals. Loglinear models are useful for analyz-
ing association patterns in n-way contingency tables. As mentioned in Fox
and Weisberg (2011), it is possible to fit loglinear models for contingency ta-
bles by using Poisson GLMs, assuming that the cell counts are independent
Poisson random variables. The canonical link for the Poisson GLM family is
the log, and all the subsequent models will be fit using this default link.
In modeling the trends in the submission process we use the three-way
contingency table displayed in Table 9.
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Status
voted withdrn
Institutional Governance n 748 323
CSR n 609 642
Activism Governance n 355 110
CSR n 971 541
Individual Governance n 2535 157
CSR n 179 25
Unions Governance n 1451 925
CSR n 53 44
Table 9: Counts of valid shareholder submissions by sponsor type, broad topics and
status.
The mosaic plot in Figure 8 suggests that under the model of mutual
independence there is quite a lot of unexplained variability in the data (sug-
gested by the lack of gray tiles). This is confirmed by the large residual
deviance (5812), which is the difference in deviance between a saturated
model (which fits the observed data perfectly) and the fitted model (here,
the mutual independence model). The associated likelihood ratio test of the
hypothesis of independence is strongly rejected (the p-value approaches 0),
also suggesting that the model of independence fits the data rather poorly.
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Figure 8: Mosaic plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type, broad
topics and status, under the independence model.
Having established that some association exists in the data, we can fit
a model of homogeneous association, allowing us to test the conditional
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dependence of all the factors. The Anova Type II tests1 in Table 10 suggest
that all pairwise associations are significant.
LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
spons 179.74 3 0.0000
topic.gen 1326.83 1 0.0000
status 1825.93 1 0.0000
spons:topic.gen 4235.90 3 0.0000
spons:status 1063.58 3 0.0000
topic.gen:status 134.82 1 0.0000
Table 10: Anova Type II tests for the model of homogeneous association for Table 9
We can now examine the goodness of the fit and the associated coeffi-
cients. The residual deviance for this model (10) is relatively small, espe-
cially considering the large variability observed in the sample. The mosaic
plot in Figure 9 confirms that the model captures most of the sample vari-
ability. The gray tiles indicate small departures from expected frequencies
under the model of homogeneous association.
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Figure 9: Mosaic plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type, broad
topics and status, under the homogeneous association model.
Following Agresti (2013), we examine the model lack of fit by computing a
dissimilarity index, which attempts to quantify by howmuch the model fails
to fit the observed data. The index ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating
a perfect fit (e.g. for the saturated model). The dissimilarity index helps in
determining whether the model lack of fit is important in a practical sense;
1 To determine the overall significance of the individual predictors in regression models, we
follow the recommendations in Fox and Weisberg (2011) and rely on the Anova Type II tests.
The Type II Anova obeys the principle of marginality, and generally addresses hypotheses of
more interest than either Type I or Type III tests. For an extended discussion of the differences
between the various types of Anova see Fox (2008).
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when the estimated index is smaller than 0.03, the observed data tend to
follow the model fit quite closely, even though the model may not be perfect.
For the homogeneous association model fitted in Table 10 the dissimilarity
index is 0.009, which means that moving less than 1% of the data would
yield a perfect fit. The model provides thus a good fit.
Moving on to the coefficient estimates, the tests for the main-effect re-
gressors are generally of no interest in loglinear models, hence we will not
interpret their coefficients. It is important to note that the “two-way inter-
action” regressors in loglinear models do not represent interaction in the
traditional sense of the term, but rather pertain to the partial association
between a pair of variables (see Fox and Weisberg, 2011).
In Table 11 the model estimates that for each type of investor, the odds
for a CSR proposal to be withdrawn are twice the odds for it to proceed to
a vote. At the same time, withdrawn proposals are twice more likely to be
on CSR than on Governance topics.
The odds for a proposal sponsored by an Individual Investor to be with-
drawn are very low, 0.13 times the odds of a proposal sponsored by an
Institutional Investor. Overall, Individual Investors are least likely to have
their proposals withdrawn. Institutional Investors and Unions, on the other
hand, are the most likely to have their proposals withdrawn. Lastly, for CSR
proposals the odds to be sponsored by a Coordinated Activist is 3 times the
odds for the proposal to be sponsored by an Institutional Investor.
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Dependent variable:
Freq
coef exp(coef)
(1) (2)
sponsActivism −0.690∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsIndividual 1.250∗∗∗ 3.480∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsUnions 0.697∗∗∗ 2.010∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
topic.genCSR −0.146∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗
p = 0.004 p = 0.004
statuswithdrn −0.753∗∗∗ 0.471∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsActivism:topic.genCSR 1.110∗∗∗ 3.040∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsIndividual:topic.genCSR −2.500∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsUnions:topic.genCSR −3.400∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsActivism:statuswithdrn −0.545∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsIndividual:statuswithdrn −2.020∗∗∗ 0.133∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsUnions:statuswithdrn 0.283∗∗∗ 1.330∗∗∗
p = 0.00004 p = 0.00004
topic.genCSR:statuswithdrn 0.742∗∗∗ 2.100∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Constant 6.590∗∗∗ 728.000∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Residual Deviance 10 10
Akaike Inf. Crit. 158.000 158.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 11: Coefficient estimates for the model of homogeneous association. Column
(1) displays the estimated conditional log odds ratios and Column (2) the
corresponding odds ratios (or risk factors). The dependent variable in the
Poisson GLM is the frequency counts from Table 9.
the environmental/social subset We can further zoom in on the
Environmental/Social subset, to see potential differences in the trends for
the two types of proposals. Table 12 displays the three-way contingency
table.
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Status
voted withdrn
Institutional Environmental n 127 159
Social n 482 483
Activism Environmental n 349 165
Social n 622 376
Individual Environmental n 54 6
Social n 125 19
Unions Environmental n 2 11
Social n 51 33
Table 12: Counts of valid shareholder submissions by sponsor type, topic and status
for the Environmental/Social subset.
The mosaic plot in Figure 10 shows that there is much less variability
within the Environmental/Social subset, since many of the tiles are gray
thus indicating only small departures from expected frequencies. Nonethe-
less, there are clear departures from the model of mutual independence (in-
dicated by the red and blue tiles). This is confirmed by the relatively large
residual deviance (226). The associated likelihood ratio test of the hypothe-
sis of independence is strongly rejected as well (the p-value approaches 0),
indicating that the model of independence doesn’t fit the data very well.
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Figure 10: Mosaic plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type, topic
and status for the Environmental/Social subset, under the independence
model.
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Having established that some association exists in the data, we can fit
a model of homogeneous association, allowing us to test the conditional
dependence of all the factors. The Anova Type II tests in Table 13 suggest
that most pairwise associations are significant. It is clear however that topic
and status are conditionally independent given the identity of the sponsor,
so we can ignore this interaction term and refit the Poisson GLM without it.
LR Chisq Df Pr(>Chisq)
spons 2342.91 3 0.0000
topic 585.87 1 0.0000
status 102.93 1 0.0000
spons:topic 53.10 3 0.0000
spons:status 152.23 3 0.0000
topic:status 0.06 1 0.8044
Table 13: Anova Type II tests for the model of homogeneous association for Table 12
We can now examine the the goodness of the fit and the associated co-
efficients for the refitted model. The residual deviance for this model (18)
is relatively small and may be practically insignificant. The mosaic plot in
Figure 11 confirms that the model captures most of the sample variability
in the the Environmental/Social subset. There is still some unexpected vari-
ability concerning Unions, but this departure is very mild. The dissimilarity
index associated with this model is 0.025, which is smaller than 0.03. The
model provides thus a good fit.
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Figure 11: Mosaic plot of shareholder-submitted proposals by sponsor type, topic
and status for the Environmental/Social subset, under the homogeneous
association model.
We can now proceed to interpret the coefficient estimates in Table 14. Pro-
posals sponsored by Coordinated Activists are more likely to be on Envi-
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ronmental than on Social topics. And withdrawn proposals are more likely
to have been sponsored by Institutional Investors than by Coordinated Ac-
tivists. Unions and Individual Investors have a small presence on these top-
ics, so it is hard to draw meaningful conclusions on these groups.
Dependent variable:
Freq
coef exp(coef)
(1) (2)
sponsActivism 0.863∗∗∗ 2.370∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsIndividual −0.973∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsUnions −2.980∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
topicSocial 1.220∗∗∗ 3.370∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
statuswithdrn 0.053 1.050
p = 0.351 p = 0.351
sponsActivism:topicSocial −0.553∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsIndividual:topicSocial −0.341∗∗ 0.711∗∗
p = 0.043 p = 0.043
sponsUnions:topicSocial 0.650∗∗ 1.920∗∗
p = 0.034 p = 0.034
sponsActivism:statuswithdrn −0.638∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsIndividual:statuswithdrn −2.020∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
sponsUnions:statuswithdrn −0.239 0.788
p = 0.260 p = 0.260
Constant 4.940∗∗∗ 139.000∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Residual Deviance 17.7 17.7
Akaike Inf. Crit. 141.000 141.000
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 14: Coefficient estimates for the model of homogeneous association for the En-
vironmental/Social subset. Column (1) displays the estimated conditional
log odds ratios and Column (2) the corresponding odds ratios (or risk factors).
The dependent variable in the Poisson GLM is the frequency counts from
Table 12.
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2.1.2 Measures of Extra-Financial Performance
The data on extra-financial performance comes from the KLD STATS database
(which stands for Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Statistical Tool for Analyz-
ing Trends in Social and Environmental Performance) provided by KLD Re-
search & Analytics Inc. We have obtained data for years 1997 through 2009.
KLD is a rating service that follows a large sample of US firms, including the
S&P 1500 constituents, and rates their strengths and concerns on a number
of extra-financial performance dimensions reflecting stakeholder concerns.
The companies are assessed on multiple indicators within seven “qualita-
tive issue areas”, namely: community relations, diversity issues (treatment
of women and minorities), employee programs, environmental performance,
product characteristics (safety and quality), human rights controversies and
corporate governance. On any given qualitative issue area, firms are as-
sessed separately on strengths and concerns. KLD’s methodology resides
on a binary assessment of strengths/concerns, with 1 indicating the pres-
ence of a specific strength (or concern), and 0 indicating its absence.
KLD releases yearly reports on firm extra-financial performance, and bases
its findings on both internal sources (e.g. annual surveys or quarterly re-
ports) as well as external sources (e.g. government reports or press articles).
While the choice of individual indicators within the qualitative issue areas
could be perceived as arbitrary, and their appraisal comes with a certain
degree of subjectivity, many scholars in the field favor the KLD database
as “the best-researched and most comprehensive” (Wood and Jones, 1995) for
extra-financial performance research. Some scholars go as far as calling KLD
the “de facto research standard at the moment” (Waddock, 2003) for measuring
extra-financial performance. As pointed out by Goss and Roberts (2011),
“while the KLD data are not without their critics, they are widely accepted
by practitioners and academics as an objective measure of corporate social
responsibility.”
One practical difficulty with using the KLD database lies in the changes
to the methodology that have happened over the years, KLD electing on
various occasions to add (remove) certain indicators to (from) the qualita-
tive issue areas. For example, even though KLD follows firms beginning
with 1991, it has introduced the “Health and Safety Strength” indicator in
the Employee category only in 2003. Conversely, the “Retirement Benefits
Strength” for the same category has been followed only up to 2009, the year
it was dropped from KLD’s assessment toolbox.
To highlight the severity of the issue, consider the methodological changes
that have occurred in 2010.2 If we focus on the Community Strengths, there
were a total of seven different indicators in this category in 2009 (Charita-
ble Giving, Innovative Giving, Support for Housing, Support for Education,
Non-US Charitable Giving, Volunteer Programs, Other Strength). However
in 2010, four of these indicators were dropped and one new added (Chari-
table Giving, Innovative Giving, Other Strength, Community Engagement).
This means that it is perfectly possible for a company to have scored a to-
tal of 7 Community Strengths in 2009 but only 3 in 2010, without there
being any substantial change in the firm’s social policies. The Community
Concerns category paints a very similar picture for 2010, the number of in-
dicators dropping from four (Investment Controversies, Negative Economic
Impact, Tax Disputes, Other Concern) to just one (Negative Economic Im-
pact).
2 KLD became part of MSCI Inc. from June 2010.
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To avoid these difficulties, but also to ensure consistency and compara-
bility with other studies, we follow Oikonomou et al. (2012) in defining a
set of so-called omnipresent indicators for each qualitative issue area, which
are reliably followed by KLD during each year of the sample period. The
far-reaching methodological changes that occurred in 2010 naturally limit
us only to KLD data up to 2009. Thus we end up with the list of indicators
shown in Table 15, which will be used to construct the Environment, Social
and Aggregate (E/S) Components.
We have omitted the Human Rights category entirely for the simple rea-
son that none of its indicators are reliably tracked over the sample period.
This is the approach taken by a number of other studies (e.g. Jo and Har-
joto 2012). We have also omitted the Corporate Governance category, which
until 2002 was known under the name of Other category. KLD’s Corporate
Governance category doesn’t seem to measure governance as the notion is
traditionally understood in the finance literature (e.g. Gompers et al. 2003).
The persistent question marks over these two categories lead us to exclude
both of them from the present study.
Another traditional difficulty with KLD data revolves around the ques-
tion of whether the strengths and concerns should be combined or treated
separately. Goss and Roberts (2011) point out that it is important to analyze
CSR strengths and concerns separately since concerns are largely exogenous
to the firm (i.e. controversial social or environmental events that managers
have less control over), whereas investments in areas viewed as strengths are
mainly discretionary (i.e. proactive CSR investments). Chatterji et al. (2014)
note that while it is common practice to aggregate strengths and concerns
for a given CSR category, aggregation might mask important firm-level dif-
ferences. Since the strengths and concerns from any given issue area appear
to be distinct constructs, we keep them separate in our analysis. However,
we’re additionally investigating the net extra-financial performance by com-
bining the constructs, even if it appears to be a flawed proxy.
We follow Oikonomou et al. (2012) in computing individual components
(e.g. for Community Strengths) by adding all the ratings of the indicators for
the strengths (or concerns) of a given issue area and then dividing them by
the number of associated omnipresent indicators. To compute an individual
component for a particular firm in a given year, we do:
COMP =
∑
n
i=1 R
n
(1)
where n is the number of omnipresent indicators associated with the
strengths (or concerns) of the particular issue area (e.g. 4 for Community
Strengths), and R represents the omnipresent indicators’ respective ratings.
This is how we compute the strengths and concerns for the Environment
Component (ENV).
For the Social Component, we aggregate the individual components of
social activity while preserving the dichotomy between strengths and con-
cerns. We thus add the strengths (or concerns) of the relevant individual
components previously constructed (Community, Diversity, Employee Rela-
tions, Product) and then divide the obtained sum by the number of com-
ponents (i.e. four). We follow Hillman and Keim (2001) and give individual
components equal weighting, thus implicitly assuming that, for instance,
community relations are just as important as product characteristics. The
reason for giving equal importance to the KLD categories is that currently
there is no theoretical framework for ranking the importance of various
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Strengths Concerns
Environment Beneficial Products and Services Hazardous Waste
Pollution Prevention Regulatory Problems
Recycling Ozone Depleting Chemicals
Clean Energy Substantial Emissions
Other Strength Agricultural Chemicals
Other Concern
Community Charitable Giving Investment Controversies
Innovative Giving Negative Economic Impact
Support for Housing Tax Disputes
Other Strength Other Concern
Diversity CEO Controversies
Promotion Other Concern
Board of Directors
Work/Life Benefits
Women & Minority Contracting
Employment of the Disabled
Other Strength
Employee Union Relations Union Relations
Relations Cash Profit Sharing Health and Safety Concern
Employee Involvement Workforce Reductions
Retirement Benefits Strength Other Concern
Other Strength
Product Quality Product Safety
R&D/Innovation Marketing/Contracting Concern
Benefits to Economically Disadvantaged Antitrust
Other Strength Other Concern
Table 15: Omnipresent indicators of KLD Issue Areas
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stakeholder groups and issues. (A similar reasoning was also used when
computing the individual components.)
To compute the strengths (or concerns) of the Social Component for a
particular firm in a given year, we do:
SOC =
COM+DIV+ EMP+ PRO
4
(2)
For our Aggregate (E/S) Component measure, we apply the same prin-
ciples as highlighted above and equally weigh the Environment and Social
components. To compute the strengths (or concerns) of the Aggregate Com-
ponent for a particular firm in a given year, we do:
AGG =
ENV+ SOC
2
(3)
After we obtain the individual and aggregate components, we compute
the changes in the KLD ratings in the short term (at 2 and 3 years) and long
term (at 5 years). For the Environment Component, we compute the changes
for strengths (or concerns) as follows:
∆ENVk = ENVt+k − ENVt (4)
where t is the reference year, and k is the number of years at which
we compute the changes. We proceed in the same manner for computing
∆SOCk and ∆AGGk, for the strengths (or concerns) of the Social Compo-
nent and the Aggregate Component, respectively.
We consider that changes at two or three years generally relate to the short
to medium term. Extra-financial performance is usually constant over time
for a given firm and a given environmental or social dimension. Many firms
have persistently high or persistently low ratings across time, indicating that
these measures are relatively persistent and change only rarely. As such we
expect that any changes in social responsibility policies in firms take time
to manifest themselves and filter into actual, measurable changes in extra-
financial performance.
Moreover, since KLD traditionally releases its reports every year around
February (covering the firms’ extra-financial performance over the previous
year), any given event conductive to a corporate policy change during that
past year may take time before it has tangible firm-wide effects and may
therefore be missed by KLD analysts. Compounding the problem is that
most corporate events are not synced with the KLD reporting practices, and
may take place less than a year before KLD releases its findings. As such we
believe that allowing two years for KLD to pick up on “immediate” changes
within firms, if any, is a sensible choice.
Changes at 5 years are considered to relate to the long term. However, for
the changes at five years one practical difficulty is that we have fewer data
points given the relatively small sample size.
2.1.3 Regression Setting and Methodological Details
In our main regression setting we attempt to explain the changes in KLD
ratings after a vote on a shareholder proposal within a firm. We rely on
multiple linear models within the Ordinary Least Squares framework. Some
consideration must be given to whether the regressions should be estimated
at the proposal level (PL) or firm level (FL). One difficulty with using the PL
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setting is that we are trying to match one yearly value (i.e. a KLD indicator)
with potentially multiple proposal outcomes in a given year.
The FL setting, on the other hand, provides us with yearly aggregated
measures (e.g. average voting support for Environmental proposals) which
can proxy for typical shareholder support for or interest in a given area of
concern. Unlike in the PL setting, the FL yearly measures can be matched
1 : 1 with the yearly KLD indicators. And to account for possible het-
eroscedasticity and dependence in the standard errors, we estimate SEs clus-
tered by firm (Arellano, 1987).
We use the ∆KLDk variables as the dependent variables throughout our
models. One of our independent variables of interest is vote, which repre-
sents the voting support that a proposal has gathered from the shareholders
of the firm.
For each firm-year observation, we compute the average voting support
for a given topic. We suspect that voting support might exhibit non-line-
arities and for this reason we include in the regressions a polynomial of
second degree for the vote variable. When the coefficients are significant we
also compute the inflection point of the fitted curve as the first derivative
of β1x+ β2x2 set equal to 0 (where x and x2 are the polynomial regressors),
thus yielding the inflection point as −β1/2β2.
We introduce various controls in the regressions. We control for the num-
ber of proposals voted or withdrawn on a given topic (e.g. Env_voted.nr or
Env_withdrn.nr).
We also control for firm characteristics like insider ownership (insown),
using a polynomial specification as well. When a valid shareholder pro-
posal isn’t withdrawn this represents a signal that there is a continuing
disagreement between firm management and the shareholder, and that the
management is unwilling to effect the requested policy change. Thus it is
safe to assume that management with ownership interests will generally
vote against shareholder proposals. In this sense, insown might be thought
of as a raw (if imperfect) measure of governance.
Other firm characteristics include firm size as proxied by the log of Total
Assets (log(AT)) or industry affiliation. We include year fixed effects and
industry effects in all of the regressions. Out of the various classifications
proposed by Fama and French (1997) we opt for the Fama-French 12 indus-
try classification, in an attempt to properly control for industry variations
but also to reduce uncertainty in parameter estimation (by avoiding a finer
classification like the Fama-French 49 industry classification which would
necessarily reduce the number of degrees of freedom in the estimation).
In our regression settings we attempt to explain the changes in extra-
financial performance by the fact of being targeted in a given year on En-
vironmental or Social topics only (Env.only or Soc.only), or on both types
of issues at the same time (EnvSoc.both), which are also variables of inter-
est. We suspect that the ’targeted’ variables may be affected by endogeneity
concerns: While we expect that the changes in extra-financial performance
would depend on the firm being targeted by shareholder-sponsored pro-
posals, we also expect that shareholders would target firms depending on
the firms’ overall KLD level in that year and on whether the firm has been
targeted on a the same topic in the past. To address endogeneity concerns
we rely on Instrumental Variables under the two-stage least-squares (2SLS)
framework. As instruments we use the level of KLD concerns and strengths
on Environmental and Social topics as well as the lagged targeted state
(from the previous year, e.g. lagged Env.only).
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Lastly, since we focus in particular on changes in extra-financial perfor-
mance, our regression setting is designed such that it uses as a control
group those firms that have been targeted only on Governance proposals
in a given year. Thus those firms with at least one Environmental or Social
proposal are considered as having been ’targeted’ in that year. This leads to
us having two model specifications: one in which the ’targeted’ dummies
are the main variables of interest and the other in which we additionally
include the number of proposals voted or withdrawn as well as the level
voting support.
2.1.4 Hypotheses Development
Annual General Meetings are generally perceived as a governance mecha-
nism which facilitates the taking of strategic decisions in firms. Such meet-
ings allow the shareholders to voice their opinion on various issues, thus
indicating to management their preferences in their capacity of owners of
the firm. In addition to voting on resolutions, shareholders may also submit
resolutions to a vote, subject to a number of conditions.
Before submitting a proposal, shareholders will often engage firm man-
agement in private on certain issues of concern. If management is responsive
and a satisfactory outcome is reached, the shareholder will take no further
action. Otherwise, the shareholder may choose to file a proposal.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) point out that informed investors will gen-
erally convey their private, costly information into market prices by en-
gaging in a trade. When a trade (i.e. exiting) is not a (satisfactory) op-
tion for an existing shareholder, they can alternatively signal their private
information via the process of shareholder-sponsored proposals, by pub-
licly submitting a proposal for a vote by all other shareholders during the
AGM. Just as prices reflect the information of informed individuals, so too
shareholder-sponsored submissions will generally reflect the private infor-
mation of informed shareholders. The mechanism of proposal submissions
becomes thus a means for the shareholders to express their concerns (and
preferences) over the running of the company.
In this sense, submissions perform the role of conveying information from
the informed to the uninformed shareholders. We expect thus that the in-
stance of targeting of a firm with a proposal on Environmental or Social
topics represents a signal of existing concerns as well as an expectation of
future deterioration in the extra-financial performance of the firm.
By making their concerns public, the event can also be seen as an instance
of heightened pressure from shareholders on firm management. The ques-
tion remains, of course, whether such pressure can be effective in affecting
corporate behavior. We would expect that a broad push on both Environ-
mental and Social topics at the same time would prove more conducive to
improvements in extra-financial performance, whereas targeting on a single
topic in a given year would generally serve more as a barometer of share-
holder concerns. By the same token, a higher number of voted or withdrawn
proposals would also represent more intense shareholder pressure on firm
management.
When a shareholder-sponsored proposal proceeds to a vote, it becomes
a means for other informed shareholders to publicly convey their private
information (and preferences) by way of voting on the submitted propos-
als. Even if the votes are ultimately not binding and the proposals are only
advisory in nature, the annual general meetings become a place for share-
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holders to signal to firm management the aspects of the firm’s business
activities that is of concern to them. As with the targeting of firms, we ex-
pect that shareholders may be effectively using voting in AGMs to signal
their expectation of future problems in the firm. Thus a higher voting share
may be associated with decreased extra-financial performance in the future.
However, once more, would such pressure from shareholders be effective in
inducing changes in corporate behavior?
When resolutions receive a majority support from shareholders, this puts
pressure on management to actually implement them (see Ertimur et al.,
2010). Contrary to Governance proposals where outcomes around and above
50% are common, Environmental and Social proposals tend to get a smaller
share of the vote (with only some 15 instances of votes above 50% in our en-
tire sample). When firms react to higher than average votes on Environmen-
tal or Social proposals, we expect that it is a means of signaling to sharehold-
ers responsiveness to their concerns. Contrary to Governance changes which
may often imply clear and immediate changes within the firm (whether fi-
nancial changes or within its structure), Environmental or Social proposals
may require fuzzier outcomes that would manifest themselves in the longer
term. So it may prove less onerous for management to signal responsiveness
in response to pressure on environmental and social topics rather than on
governance issues.
Generally we expect that firm management would be induced to address
shareholder concerns on environmental or social issues when there is a
broad push by shareholders across different topics in the same year. So
if a firm is being targeted only on a single topic in a given year (e.g. on
environmental issues), then we do not have a clear prediction on the effect
this would have on the firm’s behavior. Targeting on a single topic may
have little or no force to induce management reaction, so it is possible that
the management may react (i.e. positive effect) or not, in effect making the
shareholder proposals serve as a barometer of shareholder expectations, a
signaling effect of expected worsening extra-financial performance (i.e. neg-
ative effect).
The predictions for the effect of targeting on one topic (e.g. Social only) on
the performance of the other topic (e.g. Environmental Strengths) are even
more ambiguous: We may think that targeting on one topic may induce the
firm to disregard the other topic (i.e. negative effect) or that the firm may
start paying attention to its extra-financial performance across the board,
potentially resulting in tangible results only on the other topic (i.e. positive
effect). Firm management may even resort to using the other area of extra-
financial performance as a bargaining chip, e.g. achieve improvements in the
other domain (perhaps less onerous) to signal responsiveness to shareholder
concerns (i.e. positive effect).
However, when there is a broad push on both fronts at the same time,
we expect there to be a positive effect on extra-financial performance, i.e.
firm management would be induced into addressing shareholder concerns
resulting in an improvement in extra-financial performance (either an in-
crease in strengths or a decrease in concerns). We also expect that a higher
number of proposals submitted to a vote or being withdrawn would lead to
similar improvements, as would a higher voting support. The effect of more
proposals or votes on one topic (e.g. Environmental issues) on the other area
of concern (e.g. Social issues) remains ambiguous.
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2.2 main results
2.2.1 Environmental Proposals
Environmental Strengths
In Table 16, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in Environ-
mental Strengths (e.g. at two years: env.str.dlt2y) on our main variables of
interest, namely whether the firm was targeted only on Environmental top-
ics in a given year (Env.only), only on Social topics (Soc.only) or on both
topics at the same time (EnvSoc.both). We control for firm size and insider
ownership (using a second degree polynomial specification), as well as for
year and industry fixed effects. The SEs are clustered by firm. To address
potential endogeneity concerns for the main variables of interest, we use the
level of KLD in that year and the lagged targeted dummies as instruments.
Looking at Model (2) we see that in the short term (at 3 years) being
targeted only on Social issues in a given year seems to be associated with
an increase in Environmental Strengths. Our prediction for this effect is
however ambiguous. From Model (3), when targeted on both Social and
Environmental issues we notice a long-term improvement in Environmental
performance (at 5 years) compared to non-targeted firms, suggesting that
shareholder activism across the board (i.e. a broad push) is inductive of
management reaction to shareholder concerns.
For Models (1)-(3) we can see at the bottom of the table the joint tests
for the validity of the instruments. In all instances the p-values are close to
zero, leading us to strongly reject the null of weak instruments which in
turn suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 16 we keep the same dependent vari-
ables, but we add several variables that help quantify the intensity of share-
holder pressure. Namely we include the number of proposals that went to a
vote (Env_voted.nr and Soc_voted.nr) or were withdrawn (Env_withdrn.nr
and Env_withdrn.nr). We additionally control for the average voting sup-
port for each topic (vote_mean.Env and vote_mean.Soc), both under a sec-
ond degree polynomial specification. All controlling variables remain un-
changed. To address potential endogeneity concerns for the ’targeted’ dum-
mies, we once again use the level of KLD in that year and the lagged targeted
dummies as instruments.
Looking at Model (4) in the short term (at 2 years), we notice that higher
numbers of withdrawn proposals on Social topics is associated with an im-
provement in Environmental performance, for which we do not have a clear
prediction. Similarly, a higher proportion of favorable votes on Social topics
is associated with an increase in Environmental Strengths. We can see that
this effect is positive up to the inflection point of the fitted curve (at about
43%), which represents a majority of the sample and above which the effect
levels out.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
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Dependent variable:
env.str env.str env.str env.str env.str env.str
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only 0.027 0.018 −0.077 0.172 −0.970 −3.630
p = 0.257 p = 0.585 p = 0.202 p = 0.437 p = 0.154 p = 0.381
Soc.only 0.019 0.035∗∗ 0.029 −0.173∗∗ −0.036 0.599
p = 0.133 p = 0.028 p = 0.313 p = 0.016 p = 0.840 p = 0.274
EnvSoc.both 0.026 0.057 0.333∗∗∗ −0.047 −1.470∗ −3.190
p = 0.311 p = 0.103 p = 0.00002 p = 0.890 p = 0.082 p = 0.445
Env_voted.nr −0.070 0.662 1.750
p = 0.644 p = 0.126 p = 0.388
Soc_voted.nr 0.048 0.051 −0.121
p = 0.114 p = 0.334 p = 0.250
Env_withdrn.nr −0.122 0.945 3.360
p = 0.570 p = 0.124 p = 0.383
Soc_withdrn.nr 0.110∗∗ 0.040 −0.274
p = 0.014 p = 0.688 p = 0.300
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 −0.007 0.034 0.162
p = 0.367 p = 0.199 p = 0.401
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 0.0001 −0.0004 −0.002
p = 0.306 p = 0.191 p = 0.401
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.031
p = 0.010 p = 0.848 p = 0.320
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 −0.0001∗∗ −0.00003 0.0003
p = 0.013 p = 0.725 p = 0.328
log(AT) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.003 0.006∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.023
p = 0.003 p = 0.022 p = 0.567 p = 0.004 p = 0.026 p = 0.177
poly(insown, 2)1 0.0004 −0.00000 0.0002 0.001 −0.0003 −0.005
p = 0.547 p = 0.997 p = 0.885 p = 0.120 p = 0.824 p = 0.451
poly(insown, 2)2 −0.00001 0.00000 0.00001 −0.00003 −0.00000 0.0001
p = 0.360 p = 0.829 p = 0.800 p = 0.130 p = 0.979 p = 0.409
Constant −0.056∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.071 −0.041∗∗ −0.061 −0.125
p = 0.0002 p = 0.0004 p = 0.122 p = 0.028 p = 0.276 p = 0.349
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 38.94 46.09 48.65
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 42.61** 23.52* 46.82
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 16: Changes in Environmental Strengths at 2, 3 and 5 years
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Environmental Concerns
In Table 17, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in Environ-
mental Concerns (e.g. at two years: env.con.dlt2y) on our main variables
of interest. For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across
sections, see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (1)-(3) we see that both in the short and long term
firms targeted only on Environmental topics in a given year are associated
with a deteriorating Environmental performance, suggesting that the con-
cerns that shareholders are signaling indeed materialize. However when
firms are targeted on both topics at the same time, they appear to experi-
ence a decrease in Environmental concerns in the short term.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 17 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at Models (4) and (5), the improvement in Environmental perfor-
mance is also experienced (at 2 and 3 years) with higher numbers of voted
or withdrawn proposals, as well as with a higher proportion of favorable
votes on Environmental topics. For the voting support the improvement is
characteristic of the majority of the sample, up to the inflection point at
around 45%, above which the effect plateaus.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
Inspecting more closely the intensity needed to induce changes in firms,
we can see that shareholders need to target firms on both topics and muster
about 11% of voting support on at least two voted Environmental proposals
(the sample average for Environmental proposals) to induce improvements
in Environmental performance at 2 and 3 years. The effect is similar when
firms are targeted on both topics and there are two withdrawn Environmen-
tal proposals, or there are one withdrawn and one voted Environmental
proposals with 11% of voting support. As expected, the effect is bigger in
the case of withdrawn proposals.
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Dependent variable:
env.con env.con env.con env.con env.con env.con
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only 0.081∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.155∗∗ 1.050∗∗ 3.240∗∗ 4.080
p = 0.010 p = 0.007 p = 0.018 p = 0.023 p = 0.042 p = 0.370
Soc.only 0.043∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗ 0.058∗∗ −0.174 −0.640 −0.812
p = 0.007 p = 0.017 p = 0.014 p = 0.230 p = 0.180 p = 0.178
EnvSoc.both −0.092∗∗∗ −0.129∗∗∗ −0.135 1.070 3.010 3.440
p = 0.004 p = 0.009 p = 0.132 p = 0.113 p = 0.107 p = 0.461
Env_voted.nr −0.601∗ −1.870∗ −1.930
p = 0.068 p = 0.060 p = 0.392
Soc_voted.nr 0.027 0.118 0.164
p = 0.615 p = 0.446 p = 0.188
Env_withdrn.nr −0.915∗∗ −2.800∗ −3.740
p = 0.042 p = 0.052 p = 0.380
Soc_withdrn.nr 0.107 0.383 0.415
p = 0.209 p = 0.155 p = 0.153
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 −0.036∗∗ −0.114∗ −0.182
p = 0.031 p = 0.083 p = 0.393
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 0.0004∗∗ 0.001∗ 0.002
p = 0.043 p = 0.099 p = 0.400
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 0.009∗ 0.030 0.044
p = 0.092 p = 0.118 p = 0.185
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0005
p = 0.106 p = 0.138 p = 0.187
log(AT) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗ −0.0001 −0.006 −0.004
p = 0.010 p = 0.005 p = 0.066 p = 0.980 p = 0.639 p = 0.811
poly(insown, 2)1 −0.001∗ −0.001 −0.001 0.001 0.004 0.006
p = 0.056 p = 0.252 p = 0.377 p = 0.344 p = 0.333 p = 0.390
poly(insown, 2)2 0.00003∗ 0.00003 0.00003 −0.00001 −0.00002 −0.0001
p = 0.076 p = 0.168 p = 0.219 p = 0.704 p = 0.793 p = 0.507
Constant −0.058∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.042 −0.044 −0.047
p = 0.002 p = 0.0004 p = 0.010 p = 0.319 p = 0.734 p = 0.739
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 44.09* 47.75 49.19
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 43.65 44.42 46.04
EnvSoc.both + 2 Env_voted.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 -0.53** -1.98** -2.42
EnvSoc.both + 2 Env_withdrn.nr = 0 -0.76** -2.59** -4.04
EnvSoc.both + Env_voted.nr + Env_withdrn.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 -0.84*** -2.91** -4.23
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 17: Changes in Environmental Concerns at 2, 3 and 5 years
2.2 main results 44
Net Environmental Performance
In Table 18, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in the net En-
vironmental performance (e.g. at two years: env.diff.dlt2y), the difference
between Environmental Strengths and Concerns, on our main variables of
interest. For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across
sections, see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at Models (2) and (3), being targeted on Environmental topics
alone is associated with a worsening in net Environmental performance (at
3 as well as 5 years). However, when firms are targeted on both Environ-
mental and Social topics at the same time we notice a net improvement in
environmental performance that can be detected both in the short and long
term.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 18 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at Models (4) and (5), the improvement in net Environmental
performance is also experienced (at 2 and 3 years) with higher numbers of
voted or withdrawn proposals, as well as with a higher proportion of favor-
able votes on Environmental topics. For voting support the improvement
is characteristic of the majority of the sample, up to the inflection point at
around 46%, above which the effect plateaus.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
To improve for the net environmental performance it seems that more in-
tense pressure from shareholders is necessary. Shareholders need to target
firms on both topics and muster an average 11% of voting support on at
least four voted Environmental proposals in a given year to induce improve-
ments in net Environmental performance (at 2 and 3 years). The effect is
stronger in magnitude in the longer-run, but cannot be precisely estimated
at 5 years. The effect is similar when firms are targeted on both topics and
there are three withdrawn Environmental proposals, or there are one with-
drawn and one voted Environmental proposal with 11% of voting support.
Overall, firms seem quite reactive to pressure on environmental issues and
the level of intensity required seems to be reasonably low.
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Dependent variable:
env.diff env.diff env.diff env.diff env.diff env.diff
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only −0.054 −0.109∗ −0.233∗∗ −0.875∗ −4.210∗∗ −7.700
p = 0.167 p = 0.054 p = 0.014 p = 0.051 p = 0.041 p = 0.362
Soc.only −0.025 −0.013 −0.029 0.001 0.604 1.410
p = 0.192 p = 0.584 p = 0.435 p = 0.995 p = 0.324 p = 0.206
EnvSoc.both 0.118∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.468∗∗∗ −1.120∗ −4.480∗ −6.640
p = 0.005 p = 0.003 p = 0.001 p = 0.086 p = 0.068 p = 0.440
Env_voted.nr 0.531∗ 2.530∗ 3.680
p = 0.095 p = 0.051 p = 0.376
Soc_voted.nr 0.021 −0.067 −0.285
p = 0.662 p = 0.720 p = 0.202
Env_withdrn.nr 0.793∗ 3.750∗∗ 7.100
p = 0.066 p = 0.045 p = 0.368
Soc_withdrn.nr 0.003 −0.343 −0.689
p = 0.974 p = 0.313 p = 0.201
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 0.029∗ 0.148∗ 0.344
p = 0.069 p = 0.083 p = 0.384
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 −0.0003∗ −0.002∗ −0.004
p = 0.091 p = 0.095 p = 0.387
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 −0.001 −0.029 −0.075
p = 0.801 p = 0.255 p = 0.230
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 0.00001 0.0003 0.001
p = 0.835 p = 0.298 p = 0.234
log(AT) 0.0003 −0.002 −0.005 0.006∗ 0.018 0.028
p = 0.900 p = 0.613 p = 0.469 p = 0.090 p = 0.267 p = 0.421
poly(insown, 2)1 0.002∗ 0.001 0.001 0.0001 −0.004 −0.011
p = 0.070 p = 0.382 p = 0.516 p = 0.915 p = 0.385 p = 0.403
poly(insown, 2)2 −0.00004∗ −0.00003 −0.00003 −0.00002 0.00002 0.0002
p = 0.055 p = 0.349 p = 0.526 p = 0.528 p = 0.822 p = 0.443
Constant 0.002 0.010 0.025 0.001 −0.017 −0.078
p = 0.935 p = 0.751 p = 0.691 p = 0.985 p = 0.924 p = 0.772
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 45.62 47.36 48.93
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 50.28 46.61 46.36
EnvSoc.both + 4 Env_voted.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 1.33* 7.28** 11.87
EnvSoc.both + 3 Env_withdrn.nr = 0 1.26* 6.76** 14.67
EnvSoc.both + Env_voted.nr + Env_withdrn.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 0.52* 3.43** 7.93
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 18: Changes in Net Environmental Performance at 2, 3 and 5 years
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2.2.2 Social Proposals
Social Strengths
In Table 19, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in Social
Strengths (e.g. at two years: soc.str.dlt2y) on our main variables of inter-
est. For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across sections,
see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (1) and (2), it seems that for Social Strengths even
when targeted on both topics the shareholder-sponsored submissions serve
as a barometer of expected worsening in Social performance (at 2 and 3
years). Even a broad shareholder push doesn’t seem to have an effect, which
would suggest that when pressured by shareholders the firms are more
recalcitrant on implementing proactive social investments.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 19 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (4) and (5), higher average voting support would
seem to indicate expected future worsening in Social Strengths. Once more,
stronger shareholder pressure doesn’t seem to have an effect on manage-
ment and simply serves to register their concerns in this area of the firm.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
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Dependent variable:
soc.str soc.str soc.str soc.str soc.str soc.str
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only −0.015 −0.010 −0.030 −0.698∗∗ −0.926∗ 0.877
p = 0.279 p = 0.652 p = 0.302 p = 0.045 p = 0.069 p = 0.425
Soc.only 0.006 0.007 −0.010 0.138 0.218 −0.039
p = 0.434 p = 0.445 p = 0.460 p = 0.152 p = 0.121 p = 0.806
EnvSoc.both −0.026∗ −0.046∗∗ −0.026 −0.910∗ −0.988 1.060
p = 0.077 p = 0.035 p = 0.491 p = 0.082 p = 0.113 p = 0.346
Env_voted.nr 0.454∗ 0.566∗ −0.459
p = 0.069 p = 0.075 p = 0.403
Soc_voted.nr −0.003 −0.028 −0.003
p = 0.927 p = 0.541 p = 0.927
Env_withdrn.nr 0.673∗∗ 0.853∗ −0.845
p = 0.050 p = 0.067 p = 0.414
Soc_withdrn.nr −0.066 −0.116 −0.0003
p = 0.239 p = 0.144 p = 0.997
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 0.025∗ 0.034 −0.042
p = 0.058 p = 0.110 p = 0.417
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 −0.0003∗ −0.0004 0.0004
p = 0.070 p = 0.119 p = 0.418
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 −0.007∗ −0.010∗ 0.002
p = 0.072 p = 0.094 p = 0.822
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 0.0001∗ 0.0001 −0.00002
p = 0.083 p = 0.114 p = 0.863
log(AT) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.007∗ 0.002
p = 0.002 p = 0.001 p = 0.007 p = 0.068 p = 0.067 p = 0.722
poly(insown, 2)1 −0.0001 −0.0003 0.0002 −0.002∗ −0.002 0.001
p = 0.830 p = 0.655 p = 0.838 p = 0.079 p = 0.176 p = 0.590
poly(insown, 2)2 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00003 0.00003 −0.00001
p = 0.794 p = 0.424 p = 0.773 p = 0.194 p = 0.329 p = 0.895
Constant −0.016∗ −0.035∗∗ −0.045∗∗ −0.016 −0.043 −0.047
p = 0.088 p = 0.012 p = 0.045 p = 0.623 p = 0.320 p = 0.177
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 44.77 46.85 48.94
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 42.49 44.76 60.52
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 19: Changes in Social Strengths at 2, 3 and 5 years
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Social Concerns
In Table 20, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in Social Con-
cerns (e.g. at two years: soc.con.dlt2y) on our main variables of interest.
For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across sections,
see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (1) and (2), firms targeted only on Social topics in
a given year are associated with a deteriorating Social performance (i.e. an
increase in concerns) at 2 and 3 years, suggesting that absent a broad push
the concerns that shareholders are signaling indeed materialize. However
when firms are targeted on both topics at the same time, they appear to
experience a decrease in Social Concerns at 3 years.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 20 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (4) and (5), an improvement in Social performance
is also experienced (at 2 and 3 years) with higher numbers of voted or with-
drawn proposals, as well as with a higher proportion of favorable votes on
Social topics. For voting support the improvement is characteristic of the
majority of the sample, up to the inflection point of 43%, above which the
effect plateaus.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
It would seem that Social topics require more intense pressure from share-
holders for tangible changes in firm extra-financial performance. Sharehold-
ers need to target firms on both topics and muster about 12% of voting
support on at least six voted Social proposals (the sample average for Social
proposals) to induce improvements in Social performance in the short term.
The effect is similar when firms are targeted on both topics and there are
four withdrawn Social proposals, or when there are three withdrawn and
four voted Social proposals with 12% of voting support. This would once
more suggest that firms are less reactive to shareholder concerns on Social
topics, and more recalcitrant to implement changes.
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Dependent variable:
soc.con soc.con soc.con soc.con soc.con soc.con
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only 0.015 0.067∗∗ 0.067 −0.010 −0.963 6.220
p = 0.444 p = 0.026 p = 0.111 p = 0.972 p = 0.159 p = 0.375
Soc.only 0.030∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.013 0.363∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗ −0.423
p = 0.013 p = 0.046 p = 0.533 p = 0.0001 p = 0.007 p = 0.634
EnvSoc.both −0.029 −0.085∗∗∗ −0.065 0.482 −0.649 6.990
p = 0.173 p = 0.010 p = 0.216 p = 0.256 p = 0.427 p = 0.323
Env_voted.nr −0.017 0.591 −3.140
p = 0.928 p = 0.168 p = 0.365
Soc_voted.nr −0.103∗∗ −0.105 0.015
p = 0.023 p = 0.140 p = 0.928
Env_withdrn.nr −0.015 0.879 −5.960
p = 0.953 p = 0.158 p = 0.362
Soc_withdrn.nr −0.214∗∗∗ −0.291∗∗ 0.141
p = 0.001 p = 0.014 p = 0.738
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 −0.0003 0.036 −0.288
p = 0.972 p = 0.202 p = 0.378
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 0.00001 −0.0004 0.003
p = 0.933 p = 0.214 p = 0.378
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 −0.014∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗ 0.026
p = 0.0003 p = 0.006 p = 0.601
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ −0.0003
p = 0.002 p = 0.009 p = 0.632
log(AT) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.013∗∗ −0.009
p = 0.00003 p = 0.00000 p = 0.00001 p = 0.058 p = 0.021 p = 0.728
poly(insown, 2)1 −0.0001 −0.0004 0.001 −0.001 −0.003 0.008
p = 0.841 p = 0.693 p = 0.406 p = 0.353 p = 0.177 p = 0.409
poly(insown, 2)2 −0.00002 −0.00001 −0.00004 −0.00000 0.00002 −0.0001
p = 0.226 p = 0.585 p = 0.271 p = 0.926 p = 0.704 p = 0.402
Constant −0.041∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗ −0.117
p = 0.004 p = 0.00004 p = 0.008 p = 0.004 p = 0.017 p = 0.579
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 19.26 46.97 48.69
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 43.09*** 43.01** 50.61
EnvSoc.both + 6 Soc_voted.nr +
12 poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 = 0 -0.31 -1.56* 7.39
EnvSoc.both + 4 Soc_withdrn.nr = 0 -0.37 -1.81* 7.55
EnvSoc.both + 4 Soc_voted.nr + 3 Soc_withdrn.nr +
12 poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 = 0 -0.74* -2.22** 7.78
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 20: Changes in Social Concerns at 2, 3 and 5 years
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Net Social Performance
In Table 21, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in the net
Social performance (e.g. at two years: soc.diff.dlt2y), the difference be-
tween Social Strengths and Concerns, on our main variables of interest. For
more details on the parametrization, which is similar across sections, see the
description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at Model (1), we can see that being targeted on Social topics alone
is associated with a decrease in net Social performance in the short term (at
2 years). When firms are targeted on both Environmental and Social topics
at the same time we do not notice any net improvement.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 21 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (4) and (5), however, improvement in the net Social
performance is experienced (at 2 and 3 years) with higher numbers of voted
or withdrawn proposals, as well as with a higher proportion of favorable
votes on Social topics. This is again suggestive of stronger shareholder pres-
sure being needed to spur changes in firm policies on social topics. For vot-
ing support the improvement is characteristic of the majority of the sample,
up to the inflection point at around 42%, above which the effect plateaus.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
Overall it would seem that (very) intense pressure is required from share-
holders for tangible results on social topics. For instance, an improvement
in net Social performance would be associated on average with eight with-
drawn Social proposals and seven voted proposals with an average voting
support of 35% (which is above the 90th percentile in the sample). Firms
seem to be recalcitrant when it comes to shareholder pressure on Social
topics.
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Dependent variable:
soc.diff soc.diff soc.diff soc.diff soc.diff soc.diff
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only −0.030 −0.076∗∗ −0.096∗ −0.688 0.037 −5.350
p = 0.226 p = 0.049 p = 0.060 p = 0.136 p = 0.945 p = 0.383
Soc.only −0.024∗ −0.025 −0.023 −0.225∗ −0.320∗∗∗ 0.384
p = 0.062 p = 0.144 p = 0.329 p = 0.087 p = 0.008 p = 0.617
EnvSoc.both 0.003 0.039 0.039 −1.390∗∗ −0.339 −5.930
p = 0.901 p = 0.253 p = 0.557 p = 0.049 p = 0.585 p = 0.338
Env_voted.nr 0.471 −0.025 2.680
p = 0.145 p = 0.940 p = 0.377
Soc_voted.nr 0.100∗ 0.078∗ −0.018
p = 0.067 p = 0.060 p = 0.900
Env_withdrn.nr 0.688 −0.026 5.110
p = 0.124 p = 0.956 p = 0.371
Soc_withdrn.nr 0.149∗ 0.174∗∗ −0.141
p = 0.066 p = 0.015 p = 0.699
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 0.025 −0.001 0.247
p = 0.131 p = 0.951 p = 0.388
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 −0.0003 0.00001 −0.003
p = 0.131 p = 0.954 p = 0.388
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 0.007 0.013∗∗∗ −0.024
p = 0.176 p = 0.010 p = 0.577
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 −0.0001 −0.0002∗∗ 0.0002
p = 0.245 p = 0.012 p = 0.605
log(AT) −0.003∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.011∗∗ 0.00001 −0.005 0.011
p = 0.051 p = 0.011 p = 0.016 p = 0.998 p = 0.108 p = 0.641
poly(insown, 2)1 0.00003 0.0001 −0.001 −0.0004 0.001 −0.007
p = 0.968 p = 0.953 p = 0.447 p = 0.754 p = 0.428 p = 0.411
poly(insown, 2)2 0.00002 0.00003 0.00005 0.00003 0.00001 0.0001
p = 0.186 p = 0.292 p = 0.154 p = 0.304 p = 0.852 p = 0.353
Constant 0.025 0.051∗∗ 0.046 0.057 0.083∗∗∗ 0.070
p = 0.104 p = 0.027 p = 0.232 p = 0.159 p = 0.007 p = 0.704
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 43.99 50.83 48.65
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 43.68 41.79** 49.96
EnvSoc.both + 8 Soc_voted.nr +
35 poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 = 0 -0.34 0.75 -6.92
EnvSoc.both + 8 Soc_withdrn.nr = 0 -0.2 1.06 -7.06
EnvSoc.both + 7 Soc_voted.nr + 8 Soc_withdrn.nr +
35 poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 = 0 0.75 2.07* -8.03
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 21: Changes in Net Social Performance at 2, 3 and 5 years
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2.2.3 Aggregated Proposals
Aggregate Strengths
Lastly we consider the Aggregate (E/S) Strengths, which equally weigh the
KLD Environmental and Social indexes: Environment (50%) and Commu-
nity, Diversity, Employee Relations and Product Quality (all together, 50%).
In Table 22, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in Aggre-
gate Strengths (e.g. at two years: es.str.dlt2y) on our main variables of
interest. For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across
sections, see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (1) and (2), in the short term being targeted only
on Social issues in a given year seems to be associated with an increase
in Aggregate Strengths. When targeted on both Social and Environmental
issues in the same year we notice a long-term improvement in aggregate
performance (at 5 years).
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 22 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Model (5), the improvement in Aggregate Strengths is also
experienced (at 3 years) with higher numbers of voted or withdrawn Envi-
ronmental proposals. For voting support the estimated coefficients are in-
sufficiently precise. Overall it seems that improvements in aggregate extra-
financial performance is driven by shareholder pressure on environmental
topics.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
Inspecting more closely the intensity needed for inducing changes in
firms, we can see that shareholders need to target firms on both topics
and muster about 11% of voting support on at least three voted Environ-
mental proposals to induce improvements in Aggregate Strengths in the
short term. The effect is similar when firms are targeted on both topics and
there are three withdrawn Environmental proposals, or when there are one
withdrawn and two voted Environmental proposals with an average of 11%
voting support.
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Dependent variable:
es.str es.str es.str es.str es.str es.str
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only 0.006 0.004 −0.053 −0.263 −0.948∗ −1.370
p = 0.681 p = 0.841 p = 0.144 p = 0.148 p = 0.077 p = 0.424
Soc.only 0.012∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.009 −0.018 0.091 0.280
p = 0.084 p = 0.019 p = 0.560 p = 0.736 p = 0.531 p = 0.221
EnvSoc.both −0.00005 0.006 0.154∗∗∗ −0.479∗ −1.230∗ −1.070
p = 0.998 p = 0.793 p = 0.001 p = 0.082 p = 0.065 p = 0.542
Env_voted.nr 0.192 0.614∗ 0.646
p = 0.135 p = 0.070 p = 0.444
Soc_voted.nr 0.022 0.012 −0.062
p = 0.242 p = 0.784 p = 0.169
Env_withdrn.nr 0.275 0.899∗ 1.260
p = 0.118 p = 0.065 p = 0.433
Soc_withdrn.nr 0.022 −0.038 −0.137
p = 0.474 p = 0.635 p = 0.217
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 0.009 0.034 0.060
p = 0.179 p = 0.122 p = 0.451
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 −0.0001 −0.0004 −0.001
p = 0.217 p = 0.124 p = 0.450
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 0.0004 −0.004 −0.014
p = 0.839 p = 0.502 p = 0.264
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 −0.00001 0.00004 0.0002
p = 0.853 p = 0.590 p = 0.266
log(AT) 0.004∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.012∗
p = 0.00005 p = 0.0004 p = 0.089 p = 0.0005 p = 0.024 p = 0.096
poly(insown, 2)1 0.0001 −0.0002 0.0002 −0.0001 −0.001 −0.002
p = 0.707 p = 0.757 p = 0.801 p = 0.824 p = 0.350 p = 0.501
poly(insown, 2)2 −0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 −0.00000 0.00001 0.00004
p = 0.552 p = 0.493 p = 0.676 p = 0.894 p = 0.535 p = 0.367
Constant −0.036∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.029 −0.052 −0.086
p = 0.00005 p = 0.00004 p = 0.027 p = 0.103 p = 0.266 p = 0.122
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 47.72 46.47 48.55
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 43.52 53.52 46.13
EnvSoc.both + 3 Env_voted.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 0.2 0.99* 1.53
EnvSoc.both + 3 Env_withdrn.nr = 0 0.35 1.47* 2.7
EnvSoc.both + 2 Env_voted.nr + Env_withdrn.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 0.28 1.28* 2.14
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 22: Changes in Aggregate Strengths at 2, 3 and 5 years
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Aggregate Concerns
In Table 23, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in Aggregate
Concerns (e.g. at two years: es.con.dlt2y) on our main variables of interest.
For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across sections,
see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (1) through (3), we see that in the short and long
term being targeted only on Environmental or only on Social issues is associ-
ated with an increase in Aggregate Concerns. It seems that narrow targeting
of firms serves as a barometer of shareholder concerns over the firm’s extra-
financial performance. When targeted on both Environmental and Social is-
sues in the same year, however, we notice a short- and long-term decrease in
Aggregate Concerns, suggesting that shareholder activism across the board
(i.e. a broad push) is inductive of management reaction to shareholder con-
cerns.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 23 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (4) and (5), the improvement in extra-financial
performance is also experienced (at 2 and 3 years) with higher numbers
of voted or withdrawn Environmental proposals, as well as with a higher
proportion of favorable votes on Environmental topics. For voting support
the improvement is characteristic of the majority of the sample, up to the
inflection point at around 44%, above which the effect plateaus.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
Inspecting more closely the intensity needed to induce changes in firms,
we can see that shareholders need to target firms on both topics and muster
about 11% of voting support on at least four voted Environmental proposals
to induce a decrease in Aggregate Concerns in the short term. The effect is
similar when firms are targeted on both topics and there are four withdrawn
Environmental proposals, or when there are two withdrawn and one voted
Environmental proposals with 11% of voting support in the same year. As
expected, the effect is bigger in magnitude in the case of withdrawn propos-
als.
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Dependent variable:
es.con es.con es.con es.con es.con es.con
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only 0.048∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 1.140∗∗ 5.150
p = 0.007 p = 0.001 p = 0.005 p = 0.044 p = 0.049 p = 0.354
Soc.only 0.037∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.094 −0.051 −0.617
p = 0.001 p = 0.004 p = 0.027 p = 0.262 p = 0.759 p = 0.381
EnvSoc.both −0.060∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.100∗ 0.777∗∗ 1.180∗ 5.220
p = 0.004 p = 0.003 p = 0.094 p = 0.045 p = 0.077 p = 0.355
Env_voted.nr −0.309∗ −0.639∗ −2.540
p = 0.092 p = 0.074 p = 0.356
Soc_voted.nr −0.038 0.006 0.089
p = 0.217 p = 0.900 p = 0.498
Env_withdrn.nr −0.465∗ −0.961∗ −4.850
p = 0.062 p = 0.065 p = 0.349
Soc_withdrn.nr −0.054 0.046 0.278
p = 0.285 p = 0.621 p = 0.407
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 −0.018∗∗ −0.039∗ −0.235
p = 0.046 p = 0.087 p = 0.365
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 0.0002∗ 0.0004 0.002
p = 0.052 p = 0.104 p = 0.368
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 −0.002 0.004 0.035
p = 0.446 p = 0.603 p = 0.375
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 0.00003 −0.00004 −0.0004
p = 0.474 p = 0.657 p = 0.389
log(AT) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.002 0.003 −0.007
p = 0.00001 p = 0.00001 p = 0.00005 p = 0.223 p = 0.378 p = 0.750
poly(insown, 2)1 −0.001 −0.001 0.0002 0.00002 0.0004 0.007
p = 0.165 p = 0.286 p = 0.871 p = 0.975 p = 0.779 p = 0.378
poly(insown, 2)2 0.00000 0.00001 −0.00000 −0.00001 −0.00000 −0.0001
p = 0.697 p = 0.534 p = 0.879 p = 0.620 p = 0.966 p = 0.420
Constant −0.049∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.085∗ −0.082
p = 0.00004 p = 0.00001 p = 0.0004 p = 0.015 p = 0.060 p = 0.632
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 43.56 48.12 48.88
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 42.09 49.8 47.63
EnvSoc.both + 4 Env_voted.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 -0.66 -1.81* -7.52
EnvSoc.both + 4 Env_withdrn.nr = 0 -1.08* -2.66* -14.19
EnvSoc.both + Env_voted.nr + 2 Env_withdrn.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 -0.66* -1.81* -9.61
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 23: Changes in Aggregate Concerns at 2, 3 and 5 years
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Net Aggregate Performance
In Table 24, for Models (1) through (3) we regress the changes in the net
Aggregate performance (e.g. at two years: es.diff.dlt2y), the difference
between Aggregate Strengths and Concerns, on our main variables of inter-
est. For more details on the parametrization, which is similar across sections,
see the description in the Section 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (1) through (3), we see that in the short and long
term being targeted only on Environmental or only on Social issues in a
given year is associated with a worsening in net Aggregate performance.
Once more, it seems that isolated targeting of firms serves as a barometer
of shareholder concerns over the firm’s overall extra-financial performance.
When targeted on both Environmental and Social issues in the same year,
however, we notice a short- and long-term improvement in Aggregate per-
formance, suggesting that shareholder activism across the board is inductive
of management reaction to shareholder concerns.
For these models we can see at the bottom of the table the tests for the
validity of the instruments. We strongly reject the null of weak instruments
which suggests good identification.
For Models (4) through (6) in Table 24 we keep the same dependent
variables, but add several regressors that help quantify the intensity of
shareholder pressure. For more details on the parametrization see the Sec-
tion 2.2.1 on page 40.
Looking at the Models (4) and (5), the improvement in net Aggregate
performance is also experienced (at 2 and 3 years) with higher numbers
of voted or withdrawn Environmental proposals, as well as with a higher
proportion of favorable votes on Environmental topics. For voting support
the improvement is characteristic of the majority of the sample, up to the
inflection point at around 45%, above which the effect plateaus.
For Models (4)-(6) we also notice that the instruments provide strong iden-
tification.
Inspecting more closely the intensity needed for inducing changes in
firms, we can see that shareholders need to target firms on both topics
and muster about 11% of voting support on at least four voted Environ-
mental proposals to induce an improvement in the firm’s extra-financial
performance in the short term. The effect is similar when firms are targeted
on both topics and there are four withdrawn Environmental proposals, or
when there are two withdrawn and two voted Environmental proposals
with an average 11% of voting support. The effect is bigger in magnitude in
the case of withdrawn proposals.
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Dependent variable:
es.diff es.diff es.diff es.diff es.diff es.diff
dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y dlt2y dlt3y dlt5y
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Env.only −0.042∗ −0.093∗∗∗ −0.164∗∗∗ −0.782∗ −2.080∗∗ −6.520
p = 0.063 p = 0.007 p = 0.002 p = 0.054 p = 0.043 p = 0.357
Soc.only −0.024∗∗ −0.019 −0.026 −0.112 0.142 0.898
p = 0.038 p = 0.205 p = 0.241 p = 0.373 p = 0.632 p = 0.320
EnvSoc.both 0.060∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗ −1.260∗∗ −2.410∗ −6.290
p = 0.021 p = 0.005 p = 0.003 p = 0.042 p = 0.052 p = 0.382
Env_voted.nr 0.501∗ 1.250∗ 3.180
p = 0.085 p = 0.053 p = 0.363
Soc_voted.nr 0.060 0.005 −0.151
p = 0.198 p = 0.952 p = 0.375
Env_withdrn.nr 0.741∗ 1.860∗∗ 6.110
p = 0.061 p = 0.047 p = 0.355
Soc_withdrn.nr 0.076 −0.084 −0.415
p = 0.307 p = 0.606 p = 0.337
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 0.027∗ 0.073∗ 0.295
p = 0.064 p = 0.084 p = 0.372
poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)2 −0.0003∗ −0.001∗ −0.003
p = 0.076 p = 0.094 p = 0.374
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)1 0.003 −0.008 −0.049
p = 0.552 p = 0.527 p = 0.331
poly(vote_mean.Soc, 2)2 −0.00003 0.0001 0.001
p = 0.584 p = 0.601 p = 0.342
log(AT) −0.002 −0.004∗ −0.008∗ 0.003 0.006 0.019
p = 0.295 p = 0.091 p = 0.075 p = 0.343 p = 0.427 p = 0.489
poly(insown, 2)1 0.001 0.001 0.0001 −0.0001 −0.001 −0.009
p = 0.139 p = 0.458 p = 0.960 p = 0.892 p = 0.519 p = 0.390
poly(insown, 2)2 −0.00001 −0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.0002
p = 0.447 p = 0.972 p = 0.663 p = 0.772 p = 0.732 p = 0.389
Constant 0.013 0.031 0.036 0.029 0.033 −0.004
p = 0.315 p = 0.147 p = 0.343 p = 0.452 p = 0.709 p = 0.987
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weak instr. (Env.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (Soc.onlyTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Weak instr. (EnvSoc.bothTRUE) 0 0 0 0 0 0
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Env) 44.84 47.33 48.82
Inflect. point (vote_mean.Soc) 42.31 51.76 47.18
EnvSoc.both + 4 Env_voted.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 1.05 3.41* 9.69
EnvSoc.both + 4 Env_withdrn.nr = 0 1.71* 5.03** 18.15
EnvSoc.both + 2 Env_voted.nr + 2 Env_withdrn.nr +
11 poly(vote_mean.Env, 2)1 = 0 1.53* 4.63** 15.55
Observations 2,679 2,226 1,508 2,679 2,226 1,508
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Firm Level (FL) regressions with time fixed effects.
Standard errors clustered by firm.
Table 24: Changes in Net Aggregate Performance at 2, 3 and 5 years
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2.3 concluding remarks
This paper investigates how firms respond to shareholder engagement. The
shareholder-sponsored proposals is a governance mechanism that allows
shareholders to raise issues with firm management on various ESG issues
that affect firm stakeholders.
From examining the frequency distributions of shareholder proposals us-
ing loglinear models, we find that proposals on Environmental or Social
topics are more likely to be withdrawn than to go to a vote, and that with-
drawn proposals are more likely to be on Environmental or Social topics
than on Governance topics. Individual Investors are very unlikely to have
their proposals withdrawn, whereas Institutional Investors and Unions are
the most likely. Overall Coordinated Activists seem to be very active on En-
vironmental and Social topics. Individual Investors and Unions, however,
focus their efforts mostly on Governance issues, largely ignoring other top-
ics.
We also investigate the short-term and long-term changes in extra-finan-
cial performance after a voted or withdrawn shareholder-sponsored pro-
posal. Since the submission process may be affected by endogeneity issues,
we adopt the two-stage least squares (2SLS) framework under which we
instrument the fact of being targeted by the level of extra-financial perfor-
mance and the lagged targeted data from the previous year.
Our results suggest that being targeted on both Environmental and So-
cial topics in the same year is generally associated with improvements in
extra-financial performance, both in the short term and in the long term.
This would seem to indicate that shareholder engagement on a broad set
of issues is more conducive to changes in the extra-financial performance
of firms. Examining the intensity of shareholder pressure, we find that a
higher number of voted or withdrawn proposals, as well as a higher pro-
portion of favorable votes in AGMs are associated with improvements in
extra-financial performance (in the short term). The findings are similar for
the aggregate measures of extra-financial performance. For environmental
issues, the fitted models suggest that a low number of withdrawn and voted
proposals (with average voting support of about 10%) are needed to induce
meaningful changes in firms.
The present study could be improved in several ways. It would be impor-
tant to include in the regression setting controls for institutional ownership,
and to investigate the presence of institutional owners (or even blockholders)
and its impact on the effectiveness of the shareholder submission process.
Governance levels is another important factor that should be controlled for
and investigated, as well as including additional firm-level controls such as
past financial performance or leverage.
3THE DYNAMICS OF VOT ING ON SHAREHOLDER
PROPOSALS
One of the latest developments in socially responsible investing in the past
few decades relates to investors switching from a historically preferred strat-
egy of shunning undesirable stock (which goes back to the very beginnings
of the movement) to engaging corporations on specific topics of concern,
which usually represent attempts to influence corporate behavior and poli-
cies by way of private negotiations with management or voting in Annual
General Meetings.
Some of the literature looks at whether SRI and shareholder engagement
can be effective at inducing changes in corporate behavior. Heinkel et al.
(2001) and Gollier and Pouget (2014) develop models that look into how
investors can effect change either by voting with their feet or by promoting
change from within, respectively. Consistent with such theorizing, Hong
and Kacperczyk (2009) find that ethical investors can affect the cost of capital
of non-responsible firms.
Other studies look at the various effects of the shareholder-sponsored
proposals mechanism on firms. Ertimur et al. (2010) examine the determi-
nants of implementation of shareholder-sponsored governance proposals,
identifying shareholder pressure (e.g. voting outcome) and the topic of the
proposal as key factors. The authors identify negative labor market conse-
quences for outside directors when majority vote proposals are not imple-
mented. While Renneboog and Szilagyi (2011) find that the implementation
of governance proposals depends on voting success, but is affected by man-
agerial entrenchment and rent-seeking. Analyzing withdrawn shareholder-
sponsored proposals, Bauer et al. (2015) find that proposals on executive
compensation have an impact on future corporate pay practices.
Some papers also investigate the effects of voting on shareholder-spon-
sored proposals on the stock market. By analyzing the market reaction to
governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes, in a quasi-
experimental setting, Cuñat et al. (2012) find that improvements in corporate
governance translates into positive abnormal returns, as well as a reduction
in acquisitions and capital expenditures and a long-term improvement in
performance. Flammer (2015) adopts a similar approach for CSR proposals,
and finds that adoption of close-call proposals leads to positive announce-
ment returns and to superior accounting performance.
Several studies examine the voting patterns on shareholder-sponsored
proposals. Gillan and Starks (2000) analyze the voting outcomes on gov-
ernance proposals over the period 1984–1994 and identify sponsor identity,
issue type and prior performance as important explanatory factors, as well
as whether the proposal was voted upon later in the sample period. The
authors document an increase in the votes cast in favor of proposals over
the sample period. Thomas and Cotter (2007) study the patterns of share-
holder voting during 2002–2004 and find that compared to earlier periods,
more governance proposals were receiving majority voting support from
shareholders.
We complement this literature by investigating the time dynamics of vot-
ing on shareholder proposals, in particular how past or concurrent votes
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(or withdrawals) on similar issues affect a vote on a proposal in the present.
Using data on shareholder-sponsored proposals available from RiskMetrics
from 1997 to 2011, we categorize the proposals into narrow subtopics, which
provides us with a proxy for proposals pertaining to very similar topics.
Our results suggests that when a shareholder-sponsored proposal on a
similar issue has already been discussed in the past—whether subject to a
vote or withdrawn—, then such a proposal would gather less shareholder
support in the present. This effect also holds for concurrent discussions on
similar issues, which overall seem to draw away voting support. Moreover,
a low level of past voting support for proposals on similar topics would
induce a reduced support in the present for a proposal on such a topic.
We are able to compute thresholds for the the past support above which it
has a positive impact on a vote on a similar issue in the present. Using the
entire sample of proposals we estimate that, on average, a proposal would
receive an increased level of support if in the previous years a similar pro-
posal received more than 33% of votes. Governance proposals have a higher
threshold of 37%, while environmental and social proposals have a lower
threshold of 12%. These results suggest that governance proposals require
a relatively high level of past support to gather additional shareholder sup-
port in the future, while environmental and social proposals need a much
lower level of past support.
3.1 methodology and data
For this study we are using data on shareholder-sponsored proposals avail-
able from RiskMetrics. RiskMetrics provides records of all shareholder-pro-
posals on ESG issues filed at annual meetings in S&P 1500 firms. It includes
data for years from 1997 to 2011, for a total of 9668 proposals. The database
includes information on the identity of the firm that has received a share-
holder proposal, the identity of the sponsor, a short description of the pro-
posal, the date of the shareholder’s meeting, and the outcome of the vote
(or, if there was no vote, an indication whether the proposal was withdrawn
or omitted).
When a shareholder has a specific concern with the running of the firm,
they will usually approach the management to propose a change in corpo-
rate practices. For a description of the submission process see Section 2.1.1
on page 15.
The status of a proposal can be either voted or withdrawn. In this study
we focus exclusively on valid submissions, that is submitted shareholder-
sponsored proposals that were not omitted on technical grounds or dis-
carded for a variety of reasons. In the sections that follow all of the proposals
considered were either subject to a vote or withdrawn.
Following Karpoff et al. (1996), Gillan and Starks (2000), Bauer et al. (2015),
we categorize the proposals into three broad topics: Governance, Environ-
mental and Social. As customary in the literature (e.g., Thomas and Cot-
ter 2007 or Bauer et al. 2015), we also break down the Governance cate-
gory into four separate subcategories: Compensation, External, Internal, and
Takeover.
Tables 25 and 26 display some descriptive statistics for the main categories.
There are a total of 6901 votes across all the categories, with three quarters
relating to Governance proposals and the rest to Environmental and Social
proposals. On average Governance proposals receive a higher voting sup-
port (35%) than Environmental and Social proposals (12%). In both cases
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vote
n ColPct mean median
Corporate Governance 5089 74 35 34
Corporate Social Responsibility 1812 26 12 8
All 6901 100 29 25
Table 25: Descriptive statistics for voted proposals by broad topics.
vote
n ColPct mean median
Compensation 1540 22.3 27.6 26.2
Environmental 532 7.7 11.5 8.0
External 772 11.2 54.5 56.0
Internal 2665 38.6 35.3 33.0
Social 1280 18.5 11.9 8.0
Takeover 112 1.6 13.1 9.0
All 6901 100.0 29.2 25.0
Table 26: Descriptive statistics for voted proposals by topics.
the median is smaller than the average, suggesting a distribution skewed
to the right. The center of the distributions for both the Environmental and
Social votes are very similar, while for the various Governance-related pro-
posals there is more variation in the voting outcomes.
We further classify the proposals into much narrower subtopics, which
allows us to have a proxy for proposals pertaining to very similar topics. For
example, the Compensation category includes the Approve Compensation
and Compensation Committee subtopics. The Environmental category con-
tains the Animal and Climate Change subtopics. And the Social category
comes with the Human Rights and Non-Discrimination subtopics. Table 27
displays the full list of subtopics.
We also group sponsors into four categories: individual investors, insti-
tutional investors, coordinated activists and unions. In Table 28 we can see
that coordinated activists, institutional investors and unions were each re-
sponsible for roughly the same share of proposals that proceeded to a vote
(about 20%), while 40% of the proposals voted upon were submitted by
individual investors. Interestingly, individual investors and unions submit
relatively few Social or Environmental proposals.
Lastly, we use the classification by subtopics to compute counts of voted or
withdrawn proposals on similar topics, per firm and per year. As shown in
Table 29, when we consider all the valid proposal submissions then we have
a total of 9668 proposals in the full sample. Out of these, 71.4% proceeded
to a vote and 28.6% were withdrawn (see Table 30).
Using the information on the status of the proposals and the classification
by subtopics, for each proposal that was subjected to a vote within a firm
in a given year, we compute how many other proposals on similar issues
proceeded to a vote in the same firm during that year. We also calculate the
number of proposals on similar issues that went to a vote in the same firm
in the past 3 years. We proceed in the same way to compute the number
of withdrawn proposals, whether during the same year or in the past, to
obtain the four variables listed in Table 31.
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Subtopic n ColPct mean median
Governance Compensation Amend Compensation 291 4.22 20.48 17.00
Approve Compensation 562 8.14 38.12 41.00
Compensation Committee 16 0.23 25.39 21.00
Disclosure And Reporting Proposals 189 2.74 33.32 38.00
Increase Compensation 117 1.70 23.66 20.00
Miscellaneous 35 0.51 28.25 29.40
Restrict Compensation 330 4.78 14.09 9.00
All 1540 22.32 27.59 26.20
External Other External 245 3.55 47.28 48.20
Poison Pill 324 4.69 57.96 60.00
Reincorporation 36 0.52 16.75 10.40
Supermajority Provision 167 2.42 66.66 68.40
All 772 11.19 54.53 56.00
Internal Board 1207 17.49 42.81 41.30
Other Internal 742 10.75 18.15 12.45
Voting 716 10.38 40.38 38.00
All 2665 38.62 35.29 33.00
Takeover All 112 1.62 13.06 9.00
CSR Environmental Animal 112 1.62 5.18 5.00
Arctic Drilling 11 0.16 7.09 7.00
Ceres 47 0.68 8.30 8.00
Climate Change 184 2.67 15.01 9.00
Forest 8 0.12 10.07 7.60
Nuclear Power 40 0.58 7.88 8.00
Other Environmental 69 1.00 13.52 8.00
Pollution 61 0.88 16.07 9.00
All 532 7.71 11.50 8.00
Social Country Specific 70 1.01 9.01 7.00
Diversity 58 0.84 18.20 15.00
Health 227 3.29 7.26 6.00
Human Rights 84 1.22 15.93 9.55
Labor Standards 132 1.91 12.35 9.00
Non-discrimination 232 3.36 17.65 13.00
Other Social 413 5.98 10.97 7.00
Tobacco 64 0.93 5.58 5.00
All 1280 18.55 11.94 8.00
Table 27: Descriptive statistics for voted proposals by subtopics.
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vote
Sponsor Topic n ColPct mean median
Coordinated Activism Governance 355 5.14 25.04 17.00
CSR 971 14.07 9.78 7.00
All 1326 19.21 13.87 8.00
Individual Investor Governance 2535 36.73 34.81 33.00
CSR 179 2.59 7.81 6.00
All 2714 39.33 33.03 30.00
Institutional Investors Governance 748 10.84 41.32 39.50
CSR 609 8.82 16.33 10.00
All 1357 19.66 30.11 26.80
Unions Governance 1451 21.03 35.87 35.30
CSR 53 0.77 10.60 7.50
All 1504 21.79 34.98 34.90
Table 28: Descriptive statistics for voted proposals by investor types.
Status
Topic voted withdrawn All
Governance n 5089 1515 6604
Environmental n 532 341 873
Social n 1280 911 2191
All n 6901 2767 9668
Table 29: Counts of shareholder proposals by status and topic.
Status
Topic voted withdrawn All
Governance Pct 53 16 68
Environmental Pct 6 4 9
Social Pct 13 9 23
All Pct 71 29 100
Table 30: Unconditional frequencies of shareholder proposals by status and topic.
pvl3y Number of proposals on the same subtopic voted in the last 3 years
opvsy Number of other proposals on the same subtopic voted in the same
year
pwl3y Number of proposals on the same subtopic withdrawn in the last 3
years
opwsy Number of other proposals on the same subtopic withdrawn in the
same year
pvl3y (mean) Average voting support for proposals on the same subtopic
voted in the last 3 years
Table 31: Time dynamics variables
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Distribution of average votes in the past 3 years
N = 3323
topic.ext.pvl3y_mean
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Figure 12: Distribution of the non-zero average voting outcomes in the last 3 years
for proposals on similar issues
To complete the time dynamics variables we compute the average voting
outcome in the last 3 years on proposals on the same subtopic. When a
proposal on a similar issue hasn’t been subjected to a vote in the past, we
assume that its past support was zero. Figure 12 shows a kernel density
of the non-zero average voting outcomes in the last 3 years and Figure 13
displays the same distribution but broken down by the type of the proposal.
In addition to the main variables of interest, we control for various con-
founding factors. Using SIC codes from Compustat we classify the sample
firms according to the Fama-French 12 industry classification (Fama and
French, 1997) which allows us to control for industry fixed effects. We also
control for year fixed effects.
We analyze the data in a multivariate setting by running Proposal Level
(PL) regressions. Specifically we use linear regression models with the votes
in favor of a proposal (in percentages) as the dependent variable, with stan-
dard errors clustered by firm (Arellano, 1987). Since votes is effectively a
proportion, thus a constrained variable that takes values between zero and
one, we check the robustness of our results by performing a logarithmic
transformation of the dependent variable within the OLS framework, as
suggested in Demsetz and Lehn (1985).
3.2 main results
In Table 32 we can see the results of the linear model in which we regress
the votes in favor of a proposal on the proposal type and on dummies for
the time dynamics variables, while controlling for industry and time fixed
effects. In Model (1), we see that all the estimated coefficients for the time dy-
namics variables are statistically significant and negative. This suggests that
if a similar issue has already been discussed in the past—whether subject to
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Distribution of average votes in the past 3 years
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Figure 13: Distribution of the non-zero average voting outcomes in the last 3 years
for proposals on similar issues, for the Governance and the Environmental
or Social subsamples
a vote or withdrawn—, then such a proposal would gather less shareholder
support in the present. This effect also holds for concurrent discussions on
similar issues, which overall would seem to draw away voting support for
proposals subject to a vote. Thus the voting support seems to decrease when
a proposal on a similar subtopic was voted or withdrawn either the same
year or during the last 3 years. 1
In Model (2) from Table 32 we additionally introduce the average past
voting support for proposals on similar issues. Its coefficient is an implicit
interaction with the coefficient for pvl3y (dummy). The positive coefficient
suggests that if a proposal was subject to a vote in the past and has received
some support—on a similar issue and in the same company—, this past
outcome will impact a vote today by −16.07 + 0.485·topic.ext.pvl3y_mean.
Thus we can calculate the threshold level above which a past voting outcome
will have a positive effect on a similar proposal in the present: 33.15%.
Figure 14 describes how the shareholder support for a proposal on a given
issue in the present changes as a function of the voting support for similar
proposals in the past. On average, if a proposal on a given issue received an
average support of less than 33.15% in the past, then a vote on a proposal
on a similar issue today would receive less shareholder support. However,
if the past shareholder support was above the 33.15% threshold, then the
voting support would increase in the present.
1 Since votes is a constrained variable (taking values from 0% to 100%), there are potential statis-
tical issues associated with having a constrained dependent variable in the OLS specification.
As in Thomas and Cotter (2007), we use the log vote100−vote logarithmic transformation of the
votes variable (see Demsetz and Lehn, 1985) to check the robustness of our results within the
OLS framework. The main results from these regressions remain largely unchanged.
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Dependent variable:
Votes (percentage)
(1) (2)
Compensation 13.900∗∗∗ 10.200∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Environmental −2.410∗∗ −2.020∗∗
p = 0.019 p = 0.034
External 39.200∗∗∗ 30.400∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Internal 23.000∗∗∗ 18.100∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Takeover 2.780∗ −0.322
p = 0.078 p = 0.836
pvl3y (dummy) −2.700∗∗∗ −16.100∗∗∗
p = 0.00001 p = 0.000
opvsy (dummy) −4.940∗∗∗ −3.510∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.00000
opwsy (dummy) −4.870∗∗∗ −3.890∗∗∗
p = 0.00002 p = 0.0004
pwl3y (dummy) −4.700∗∗∗ −3.550∗∗∗
p = 0.00000 p = 0.00001
pvl3y (mean) 0.485∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Constant 0.679 4.920∗∗∗
p = 0.642 p = 0.0003
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Support threshold 33.15
Observations 6,901 6,901
R2 0.379 0.444
F Statistic 123.000∗∗∗ 157.000∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 32: Linear regression models at Proposal Level, with votes in favor of a pro-
posal being regressed on proposal type and the time dynamics variables.
We control for industry and time fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
firm.
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Dependent variable:
Votes (percentage)
(1) (2)
Individual Investor 17.700∗∗∗ 10.900∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Institutional Investors 12.700∗∗∗ 9.310∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Unions 18.000∗∗∗ 12.000∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
pvl3y (dummy) −2.250∗∗∗ −21.100∗∗∗
p = 0.0003 p = 0.000
opvsy (dummy) −4.480∗∗∗ −2.440∗∗∗
p = 0.00000 p = 0.0002
opwsy (dummy) −5.830∗∗∗ −4.060∗∗∗
p = 0.00000 p = 0.0002
pwl3y (dummy) −6.610∗∗∗ −4.370∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
pvl3y (mean) 0.686∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Constant 2.750 8.240∗∗∗
p = 0.147 p = 0.00000
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Support threshold 30.75
Observations 6,901 6,901
R2 0.186 0.332
F Statistic 49.100∗∗∗ 103.000∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 33: Linear regression models at Proposal Level, with votes in favor of a pro-
posal being regressed on sponsor type and the time dynamics variables.
We control for industry and time fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by
firm.
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Figure 14: The evolution of the support for a proposal given past voting support for
similar proposals
The results hold if we change the specification and instead regress the
votes in favor of a proposal on the sponsor type (see Table 33). If a given
issue has already been discussed in the past, then a proposal on a similar
issue today would gather less shareholder support. The threshold for the
change in voting support is similar at 30.75%.
The results also do not change significantly when we consider the full
model, and regress the votes in favor of a proposal on both the proposal
type and the sponsor type (see Table 34). The voting support decreases if
a proposal on the same subtopic was discussed either this year or during
the last 3 years. The threshold for the change in support remains stable at
31.64%.
It is interesting to see how the support threshold differs for the various
types of sponsors (Table 35). We regress the votes in favor of a proposal
on the proposal type and on dummies for the time dynamics variables for
each of the four sub-samples of sponsor types, while controlling for indus-
try and time fixed effects. We notice that unions and institutional investors
have a similar support threshold at around 32%, which is in line with the
threshold identified for the full sample. However, for a proposal submitted
by an individual investors on a given issue to gather more support, it is nec-
essary that the past voting support on similar proposals be relatively high
(38.5%). As for coordinated activists, the opposite holds: A past support of
just 16% is sufficient so that a proposal on a similar issue would gather more
shareholder support in the present.
Table 36 describes how the support threshold differs across proposal types.
For a proposal related to governance issues to gather more support in the
present, it is necessary that the past voting support on similar proposals be
relatively high (37.3%). However, for proposals related to environmental or
social issues, the threshold is much lower. A past shareholder support of
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Dependent variable:
Votes (percentage)
(1) (2)
Compensation 14.000∗∗∗ 11.000∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Environmental −1.340 −1.190
p = 0.199 p = 0.213
External 41.700∗∗∗ 33.600∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Internal 23.600∗∗∗ 19.300∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Takeover 5.100∗∗∗ 2.470
p = 0.002 p = 0.118
Individual Investor −0.895 −2.120∗∗∗
p = 0.334 p = 0.008
Institutional Investors 6.130∗∗∗ 4.950∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Unions 4.190∗∗∗ 2.630∗∗∗
p = 0.0002 p = 0.005
pvl3y (dummy) −1.860∗∗∗ −15.200∗∗∗
p = 0.001 p = 0.000
opvsy (dummy) −4.610∗∗∗ −3.220∗∗∗
p = 0.00000 p = 0.00001
opwsy (dummy) −4.540∗∗∗ −3.610∗∗∗
p = 0.0001 p = 0.001
pwl3y (dummy) −4.160∗∗∗ −3.100∗∗∗
p = 0.00001 p = 0.00004
pvl3y (mean) 0.480∗∗∗
p = 0.000
Constant −0.676 3.910∗∗∗
p = 0.655 p = 0.006
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes
Support threshold 31.64
Observations 6,901 6,901
R2 0.392 0.456
F Statistic 119.000∗∗∗ 151.000∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 34: Linear regression models at Proposal Level, with votes in favor of a pro-
posal being regressed on proposal type, sponsor type and the time dynam-
ics variables. We control for industry and time fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered by firm.
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Dependent variable:
Votes (percentage)
Unions Activists Individual Institutional
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Compensation 21.000∗∗∗ 4.950∗∗∗ 8.680∗∗∗ 14.800∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.0004 p = 0.00000 p = 0.000
Environmental −8.500∗∗ −3.020∗∗∗ 3.850 −1.100
p = 0.021 p = 0.001 p = 0.234 p = 0.456
External 38.900∗∗∗ 40.700∗∗∗ 32.200∗∗∗ 36.700∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Internal 24.800∗∗∗ 12.900∗∗∗ 21.200∗∗∗ 21.500∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Takeover 6.310 0.836 4.490
p = 0.121 p = 0.714 p = 0.408
pvl3y (dummy) −16.300∗∗∗ −7.710∗∗∗ −20.800∗∗∗ −15.300∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
opvsy (dummy) −2.200∗ −2.400∗ −4.320∗∗∗ −2.430
p = 0.057 p = 0.067 p = 0.00001 p = 0.172
opwsy (dummy) −6.390∗∗∗ −3.320∗∗ −2.980∗ 0.605
p = 0.001 p = 0.016 p = 0.096 p = 0.801
pwl3y (dummy) −3.400∗∗ −0.920 −5.520∗∗∗ −3.710∗
p = 0.040 p = 0.325 p = 0.00004 p = 0.053
pvl3y (mean) 0.490∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.541∗∗∗ 0.479∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.000
Constant −1.200 8.100∗∗∗ −0.115 8.760∗∗∗
p = 0.732 p = 0.00001 p = 0.968 p = 0.0004
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Support threshold 33.33 15.98 38.5 32.01
Observations 1,504 1,326 2,714 1,357
R2 0.268 0.404 0.475 0.428
F Statistic 15.800∗∗∗ 25.000∗∗∗ 69.100∗∗∗ 28.200∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 35: Linear regression models at Proposal Level and by subsamples of sponsor
types, with votes in favor of a proposal being regressed on proposal type
and the time dynamics variables. We control for industry and time fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered by firm.
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Dependent variable:
Votes (percentage)
Governance CSR Environmental Social
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual Investor 5.240∗∗∗ −2.480∗∗∗ −2.580∗∗ −2.730∗∗
p = 0.00005 p = 0.002 p = 0.019 p = 0.014
Institutional Investors 9.820∗∗∗ 4.560∗∗∗ 4.700∗∗∗ 4.130∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.00004 p = 0.00000
Unions 5.050∗∗∗ −0.887 −4.460∗∗∗ −1.200
p = 0.0002 p = 0.520 p = 0.003 p = 0.406
pvl3y (dummy) −26.000∗∗∗ −6.990∗∗∗ −6.690∗∗∗ −7.060∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.00000 p = 0.00001
opvsy (dummy) −3.700∗∗∗ −0.791 1.220 −1.690∗∗∗
p = 0.00000 p = 0.198 p = 0.517 p = 0.009
opwsy (dummy) −5.360∗∗∗ −0.445 −2.030 −0.172
p = 0.0003 p = 0.563 p = 0.160 p = 0.852
pwl3y (dummy) −5.330∗∗∗ −0.391 −0.542 −0.610
p = 0.000 p = 0.530 p = 0.589 p = 0.465
pvl3y (mean) 0.697∗∗∗ 0.601∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗ 0.597∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.00000 p = 0.00001
Constant 15.600∗∗∗ 4.630∗∗∗ 0.023 5.490∗∗∗
p = 0.000 p = 0.000 p = 0.990 p = 0.000
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Support threshold 37.27 11.64 12.62 11.82
Observations 5,089 1,812 532 1,280
R2 0.285 0.268 0.311 0.276
F Statistic 61.000∗∗∗ 19.700∗∗∗ 6.830∗∗∗ 14.400∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 36: Linear regression models at Proposal Level and by subsamples of proposal
types, with votes in favor of a proposal being regressed on sponsor type
and the time dynamics variables. We control for industry and time fixed
effects. Standard errors clustered by firm.
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around 12% is sufficient so that a proposal on a similar issue would gather
more shareholder support in the present. There are no important differences
between environmental and social proposals in this respect.
3.3 concluding remarks
In this paper we investigate the time dynamics of voting on shareholder-
sponsored proposals on ESG issues, and more specifically how past or con-
current votes (or withdrawals) on similar issues affect a vote on a proposal
today. Using data on shareholder-sponsored proposals available from Risk-
Metrics from 1997 to 2011, we categorize the proposals into very narrow
subtopics, which allows us to have a proxy for proposals pertaining to very
similar topics. Within the OLS framework we attempt to explain the votes
in favor of a proposal using different model specifications, while controlling
for several factors including the industry and time fixed effects. Specifically
we are interested in how the time dynamics variables influence the voting
support on a given issue.
Our results suggest that a low level of past voting support for shareholder-
sponsored proposals on a given issue would induce a reduced support in
the present for a proposal on a similar issue. We are able to compute thresh-
olds above which the past support has a positive impact on a vote on a
similar issue today. Using the entire sample of proposals we estimate that,
on average, a proposal would receive an increased level of support this year
if in the previous years a similar proposal received more than 33% of votes.
Governance proposals have a higher threshold of 37%, while Environmental
and Social proposals have a lower threshold of 12%. These results suggest
that governance proposals require a relatively high level of past support to
gather additional shareholder support in the future, while environmental
and social proposals need a much lower level of past support.
This study could be improved in a number of ways. We could investigate
the potential association between the votes on shareholder proposals hap-
pening concurrently in the same industry or in firms partly owned by the
same shareholder. This would allow to test if there is an industry spillover
effect, specifically whether the voting outcome increases on average when
very similar issues are up for a vote at the same time in several firms and
in the same industry. A similar spillover effect could be identified for con-
current votes that take place in firms partly owned by a given shareholder.
It would also improve the robustness of the results if we added various
other control variables in the model specification, like insider ownership,
institutional ownership or governance measures (e.g. Gompers et al., 2003),
as well as firm-level data such as past financial performance or leverage.
Lastly, given the constrained dependent variable, future work should con-
sider adopting the GLM framework with the logit link for modeling share-
holder voting.
4DO F INANCIAL ANALYSTS CARE ABOUT
EXTRA -F INANCIAL INFORMAT ION?
It is generally not clear how much extra-financial information is reflected
into the flows of financial information. Our study investigates this by de-
veloping an econometric model that attempts to establish an association
between the flows of financial and extra-financial information. We apply the
model to data collected from S&P 1500 firms, relying on historical Earnings
per Share (EPS) estimates and extra-financial ratings.
The existing literature has already looked into the relationship between
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the financial performance of firms.
The meta-study by Orlitzky et al. (2003) aggregates 52 studies while adjust-
ing for sampling and measurement errors, and identifies a positive relation-
ship between extra-financial and financial performance. The authors also
find that extra-financial performance is more highly correlated with (back-
ward looking) accounting-based measures of financial performance than
with (forward looking) market-based measures. It remains unclear however
in which direction points the arrow of causality, nor whether extra-financial
performance is priced in financial markets.
Other studies have focused on the relation between extra-financial perfor-
mance and market-based financial indicators. Derwall et al. (2005) investi-
gate the concept of “eco-efficiency”, a relative environmental performance
metric (from Innovest Inc.) that can be understood as the ratio of the value
added to the waste that the company generates in the process. Although
companies from environmentally sensitive industries such as mining would
often be rated poorly according to “absolute” environmental criteria, they
may do well relative to competitors, according to eco-efficiency measures.
The authors construct and analyze two mutually exclusive portfolios with
distinctive eco-efficiency scores and measure their performance using the
Carhart (1997) four-factor model. They find that the high-ranked portfolio
produced higher average returns compared to the low-ranked portfolio over
the period of 1995–2003. The results suggest that markets fail to price in envi-
ronmental performance by firms, with the eco-efficiency premium pointing
to potential missing risk factors in traditional asset pricing models.
Edmans (2011) focuses on the social aspect of extra-financial performance,
analyzing the relation between employee satisfaction—using as a proxy the
widely publicized Fortune’s “100 Best Companies to Work For in America”
rating—and long-run stock returns. Based on historical data from 1984 to
2009, the paper compares the portfolio with industry- and characteristics-
matched benchmarks using the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. The study
finds that the portfolio outperforms the benchmarks over the period. The
implications that arise are that stock markets fail to fully incorporate intan-
gible assets like social performance into asset prices.
The present study is related to the literature attempting to identify whether
Environmental, Social or Governance (ESG) information is incorporated into
the financial flows of information. Using historical EPS estimates and KLD
ratings, we look into whether yearly changes in extra-financial performance
help in explaining the yearly changes in EPS forecasts by financial ana-
lysts. We find that overall financial analysts expect improvements in social
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strengths to translate into a lower EPS in the short term, whereas this effect
isn’t detected when using realized EPS. This suggests that the analysts may
be wrong in their estimations when considering shifts in firms’ proactive
social investments. A decrease in social concerns (i.e. an improvement) is
however reflected in both improved EPS forecasts and improved actual EPS
results. This would suggest that financial analysts are correct in perceiving
positive shifts in (largely exogenous) social concerns as a positive signal for
the firms’ financial performance. Lastly, when considering the firms’ net
extra-financial performance these two effects seem to cancel each other out.
There are important variations of these effects across industries.
4.1 econometric model
To understand how analysts account for extra-financial flows of informa-
tion, let us consider a given stock i. Let Cim denote the analyst consensus
observed at time m, with m ∈ {m1,m2,m3, ...}. And let Risi denote the extra-
financial ratings observed at time si ∈
{
si1, s
i
2, s
i
3, ...
}
. For simplicity, we will
subsequently use t as an index for the different specific dates.
We assume that the underlying processes are given by:
Cit = F
i
t + P
i
t + ε
Ci
t , and
Rit = P
i
t + E
i
t + ε
Ri
t ,
where all random variables are independent from each other. Fit and E
i
t
represent “pure” financial and social information, respectively, while Pit rep-
resents social information that has financial value, and which should be
priced in. Both processes allow for noise via the error parameter, ε.
Testing whether cov
(
Cit,R
i
t
)
= var
(
Pit
)
> 0 should allows us to detect if
there is an association between the two processes, Cit and R
i
t. Analyzing this
hypothesis, the main econometric problem that would arise is that of asyn-
chronous data. The processes Ci and Ri are not necessarily observed at the
same time, which could mean that each incorporates different information.
A potential issue could have been that Ri was observed only when there
was a social event, i.e. a problem of endogenous observation times. In the
case of our data, however, both processes can be considered exogenous.
4.2 methodology and data
To test the econometric model, we used data from the IBES database and
the KLD ratings agency, while controlling for various firm characteristics
obtained from Compustat.
4.2.1 Description
The IBES database (Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System) contains historical
forecasts for various companies in 70 different markets. The data set, after
synchronization with other data sources, has information on about 1000 in-
dividual US companies for the years 1996 to 2006 covering the S&P 1500.
Each firm has yearly information on the historical Earnings per Share (EPS)
estimates—mean and median—and on the number of estimates used to de-
termine the financial analysts consensus. The dates of the publication of
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the one and two year-ahead EPS estimates have, respectively, an 8- and 20-
month lag from the Fiscal Period End (FPE) of the firm. Taking the EPS
forecasts made 4 months after the previous FPE ensures that the analysts
took into account the actual, reported previous earnings of the firm (Ed-
mans, 2011). The IBES estimates are used as a proxy for investor expecta-
tions given all the corporate events that happened prior to the publication
date.
The extra-financial ratings are provided by KLD Research & Analytics, an
extra-financial ratings agency. Out of the seven major qualitative issue areas1
of these ratings, in the present study we only consider the first five dimen-
sions. We have omitted the Human Rights category entirely for the simple
reason that none of its indicators are reliably tracked over the sample period.
This is the approach taken by a number of other studies (e.g. Jo and Har-
joto 2012). We have also omitted the Corporate Governance category, which
until 2002 was known under the name of Other category. KLD’s Corporate
Governance category doesn’t seem to measure governance as the notion is
traditionally understood in the finance literature (e.g. Gompers et al. 2003).
In assessing a dimension KLD will evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
of a firm, such as—e.g. for the Employee Relations dimension —health and
safety, retirement benefits, union relations, cash profit sharing or workforce
reductions, and attributes a binary indicator. The ratings are traditionally
released towards the beginning of every year, and cover all the corporate
events that have occurred prior to the publication date.
To aggregate the various KLD indicators we follow the omnipresent indica-
tors methodology in Oikonomou et al. (2012). 2 A traditional difficulty with
KLD data revolves around the question of whether the strengths and con-
cerns should be combined or treated separately. Goss and Roberts (2011)
point out that it is important to analyze CSR strengths and concerns sepa-
rately since concerns are largely exogenous to the firm (i.e. controversial so-
cial or environmental events that managers have less control over), whereas
investments in areas viewed as strengths are mainly discretionary (i.e. proac-
tive CSR investments). Since the strengths and concerns from any given
issue area appear to be distinct constructs, we keep them separate in our
analysis. However, we’re additionally investigating the net extra-financial
performance by combining the constructs, even if it appears to be a flawed
proxy. In this study we are focusing on yearly changes as described in Sec-
tion 4.2.3.
We also control for time fixed effects as well as industry fixed effects. For
the industry dummies (and cross-sections) we rely on the Fama-French 5
and 12 industry classifications (see Table 37).
We also use Compustat data for controlling for firm characteristics. In
particular we use Total Assets as a proxy for firm size and the number of
common shares outstanding, which is particularly relevant in the context of
EPS estimates.
4.2.2 Issues
Several issues arose when synchronizing the various data sets. Perhaps the
most challenging statistical issue in the present analysis was that of asyn-
1 The full list of the KLD ratings extra-financial dimensions used in this paper: Environment,
Community, Diversity, Employee Relations, Product Quality, Corporate Governance and Hu-
man Rights.
2 See Table 15 on page 35 for more details on the approach.
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idx ind description
1 Cnsmr Consumer Durables, NonDurables, Wholesale, Retail, and Some
Services (Laundries, Repair Shops)
2 Manuf Manufacturing, Energy, and Utilities
3 HiTec Business Equipment, Telephone and Television Transmission
4 Hlth Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs
5 Other Other – Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertain-
ment, Finance
(a) FF5
idx ind description
1 NoDur Consumer NonDurables – Food, Tobacco, Textiles, Apparel,
Leather, Toys
2 Durbl Consumer Durables – Cars, TV’s, Furniture, Household Appli-
ances
3 Manuf Manufacturing – Machinery, Trucks, Planes, Off Furn, Paper,
Com Printing
4 Enrgy Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction and Products
5 Chems Chemicals and Allied Products
6 BusEq Business Equipment – Computers, Software, and Electronic
Equipment
7 Telcm Telephone and Television Transmission
8 Utils Utilities
9 Shops Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services (Laundries, Repair Shops)
10 Hlth Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs
11 Money Finance
12 Other Other – Mines, Constr, BldMt, Trans, Hotels, Bus Serv, Entertain-
ment
(b) FF12
Table 37: Fama-French industry classifications
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chronous data. The two processes considered—the EPS forecasts and KLD
ratings—are exogenous and most often happen at different moments. While
the KLD ratings for a given year are published in February of the next year,
the IBES estimates are published four months after the previous FPE, which
can happen in any month of the year. The obvious concern was to ensure
that at publication date both streams of information incorporated the same
past events for a given company.
A complicating factor is that some firms changed the Fiscal Period End
month during the sample period. For example, some firms would end the fis-
cal period in August until the year 2000, while subsequently the FPE month
would be changed to December. Since the KLD ratings are always published
at the same date, it can be challenging to ensure that both estimates incor-
porate similar information.
In an effort to optimally synchronize the data sets while losing as lit-
tle data as possible, we focused on the firms with the FPE falling in the
four months between September and December. Consequently, given the
8 month lag, the EPS forecasts for these firms were being published by fi-
nancial analysts between January and April of each year. With the KLD
ratings published in February of each year, the lag between the two events
was little so as to be considered inconsequential. Considering the long-term
perspective and the low variability of social events, we could reasonably
assume that both February and January–April estimates incorporated simi-
lar information flows concerning the extra-financial events in firms. Given
the asynchronous publication times, this has allowed us to align the data at
reasonably close periods, while discarding as few data points as possible.
This has led us to drop non-September–December FPE entries for several
firms. Once the synchronization was complete and given the missing data
for the various years in the data sets, we ended up with about 6250 observa-
tions concerning a little over 1100 firms spanning eleven years from 1996 to
2006.
4.2.3 Yearly Changes
In this paper we focus on how the changes in extra-financial performance in
firms influences the EPS forecasts by financial analysts. For this we compute
three types of EPS yearly changes from the raw data, as well as KLD yearly
changes.
The one year changes in the KLD ratings were computed as shown in (5).
These would be tested against one year-ahead EPS changes (6). We would
subsequently attempt to determine whether the changes in EPS forecasts
vary with changes in the extra-financial dimensions.
In the formulae t represents the date of publication. The formulae were
applied to each individual firm for contiguous years.
∆KLDt = KLDt − KLDt−1 (5)
∆EPS
1y
t = EPS
1y
t − EPS
1y
t−1 (6)
The variations in two year-ahead EPS forecasts (7) would be tested against
(5). They would indicate how the two year-ahead EPS estimates evolve with
yearly changes in the KLD dimensions. This would provide a longer-term
perspective.
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t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
∆KLDt
KLDt−1 KLDt
Figure 15: Changes using KLD ratings (Equation 5)
t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
∆EPS
1y
t
EPS
1y
t−1 EPS
1y
t
Figure 16: Changes using one-year forecasts (Equation 6)
∆EPS
2y
t = EPS
2y
t − EPS
2y
t−1 (7)
With the third statistic (8) we test whether the changes in the prediction of
future earnings are related to the changes in extra-financial ratings (5). The
statistic represents a measure of refinement—at t—of financial forecasts.
∆EPSst = EPS
1y
t − EPS
2y
t−1 (8)
Lastly we also compute the yearly changes in actual accounting perfor-
mance as represented by realized EPS. Since the realized EPS figures are
generally published 8 months (1 year 8 months) after the yearly forecasts by
IBES had been released, the realized ∆EPS will usually comprise an eight
month lag compared to the other changes.
∆EPSat+1 = EPS
a
t+1 − EPS
a
t (9)
4.3 main results
In our main regression setting, we attempt to explain the changes in mean
EPS forecasts by the changes in environmental and social ratings, while
controlling for changes in firm size (as proxied by total assets) and in the
number of shares outstanding. We also control for time and industry fixed
effects (using Fama-French 12 classification). The sample is trimmed by the
t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
∆EPS
2y
t
EPS
2y
t−1 EPS
2y
t
Figure 17: Changes using two-year forecasts (Equation 7)
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t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
∆EPSst
EPS
2y
t−1 EPS
1y
t
Figure 18: “Smart” changes (Equation 8)
t− 2 t− 1 t t+ 1 t+ 2
∆EPSat+1
EPSat EPSat+1
Figure 19: Changes using the actual, realized EPS (Equation 9)
1%most extreme data. The standard errors are clustered by firm. The results
are largely robust when using median (instead of mean) EPS forecasts.
4.3.1 Strengths
First we look at how the changes in EPS forecasts vary with the changes
in KLD strengths. Examining the full sample, we notice in Table 38 that
changes in social strengths are useful at explaining changes in forecasted
EPS. It seems that in the short term financial analysts perceive improvements
in social strengths as an unnecessary expenditure by firms. The results are
similar and consistent for all three estimators of the changes in forecast EPS.
If we examine instead the changes in the realized EPS, we see in Table 39
that while the coefficient for social strengths is still negative, it is no longer
significant. It would appear that while financial analysts do take into ac-
count changes in social strengths when predicting future EPS, the actual ac-
counting measures do not reflect this information. One interpretation would
ibes1.meanest.dlt1y
all
ibes2.meanest.dlt1y
all
ibes2.meanest.dlt12y
all
(1) (2) (3)
env_str.comp.dlt1y 0.067 −0.002 0.052
p = 0.663 p = 0.992 p = 0.726
soc_str.comp.dlt1y −0.486∗ −0.522∗∗ −0.522∗
p = 0.072 p = 0.042 p = 0.063
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,007 5,007 5,007
R2 0.076 0.088 0.095
F Statistic 17.000∗∗∗ 20.000∗∗∗ 21.700∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.meanest.dlt1y, ibes2.meanest.dlt1y, ibes2.meanest.dlt12y (variables of interest)
Table 38: Changes in EPS forecasts on changes in KLD Strengths, using the full sam-
ple.
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ibes1.actual.dlt1y
all
env_str.comp.dlt1y 0.272
p = 0.276
soc_str.comp.dlt1y −0.413
p = 0.434
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes
Year dummies Yes
Size Yes
Shares outstanding Yes
Observations 4,849
R2 0.031
F Statistic 6.330∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.actual.dlt1y (variables of interest)
Table 39: Changes in realized EPS measures on changes in KLD Strengths, using the
full sample.
be that the financial analysts are wrong when accounting for improvements
in social strengths as having a negative effect on future EPS.
Examining industry cross-sections (using the Fama-French 5 classifica-
tion) we notice interesting variations across industries (see Table 40). The
effect of social strengths identified in the full sample seems almost entirely
driven by the Consumer industries (like Consumer Durables such as Cars
or Furniture, Non-durables such as Food or Textiles, or Retail Stores3). For
these industries analysts estimate that an improvement in social strengths
would adversely affect forecasted future EPS in firms. For the Health indus-
tries (like Medical Equipment or Drugs) there seems to be a negative effect
of improved environmental strengths on forecasted EPS. The Other indus-
tries (like Mining, Construction or Transportation) exhibit a similar negative
effect from improved environmental strengths.
Turning to the realized EPS in Table 41, the Other industries indeed expe-
rience in the short term a negative effect of improved environment strengths
on their actual EPS, giving credence to the financial analysts. On the other
hand, the realized EPS in the Consumer industries doesn’t seem to be af-
fected by changes in social strengths, contrary to the estimates made by fi-
nancial analysts. The Health industries also do not seem to have the realized
EPS affected by changes in environmental strength. However, in Manufac-
turing industries the realized EPS is higher with improved environmental
strengths. This suggests that financial analysts fail to account for this factor
when estimating EPS forecasts.
4.3.2 Concerns
Looking at how the changes in EPS forecasts vary with the changes in KLD
concerns, we notice in Table 42 that for the the full sample the changes in
social concerns are useful at explaining changes in forecasted EPS. In the
short term financial analysts perceive a decrease in social concerns as finan-
cially useful by firms. This result is only detected when using the “smart”
measure of changes in forecasted EPS.
Examining next the changes in the realized EPS, we see in Table 43 that the
coefficient for social strengths is still negative, and there is some evidence
of statistical significance with a p-value around 10%. Since improvements in
3 See Table 37 for a description of the Fama-French industry classifications.
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ibes1.meanest.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_str.comp.dlt1y −0.240 0.315 0.289 −0.453∗ −1.260∗∗
p = 0.577 p = 0.164 p = 0.109 p = 0.053 p = 0.034
soc_str.comp.dlt1y −1.600∗ 0.007 −0.354 −0.235 −0.194
p = 0.051 p = 0.990 p = 0.425 p = 0.625 p = 0.715
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.089 0.125 0.105 0.026 0.052
F Statistic 5.500∗∗∗ 17.500∗∗∗ 6.540∗∗∗ 0.724 6.470∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.meanest.dlt1y (variables of interest)
ibes2.meanest.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_str.comp.dlt1y −0.215 0.230 0.219 −0.380∗ −1.590∗∗
p = 0.665 p = 0.277 p = 0.209 p = 0.063 p = 0.023
soc_str.comp.dlt1y −1.500∗∗ 0.096 −0.634 −0.544 −0.200
p = 0.033 p = 0.852 p = 0.170 p = 0.341 p = 0.670
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.088 0.144 0.112 0.029 0.066
F Statistic 5.440∗∗∗ 20.800∗∗∗ 7.040∗∗∗ 0.809 8.310∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(b) ibes2.meanest.dlt1y (variables of interest)
ibes2.meanest.dlt12y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_str.comp.dlt1y −0.069 0.082 0.140 −0.171 −0.952∗∗∗
p = 0.910 p = 0.725 p = 0.423 p = 0.372 p = 0.009
soc_str.comp.dlt1y −1.430∗ 0.092 −0.888 −0.343 −0.180
p = 0.070 p = 0.861 p = 0.175 p = 0.487 p = 0.726
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.078 0.146 0.121 0.032 0.064
F Statistic 4.770∗∗∗ 21.000∗∗∗ 7.690∗∗∗ 0.910 8.030∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(c) ibes2.meanest.dlt12y (variables of interest)
Table 40: Changes in EPS forecasts on changes in KLD Strengths, using industry
cross-sections (FF5).
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ibes1.actual.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_str.comp.dlt1y 1.470 0.573∗∗ −0.028 −0.217 −0.963∗∗
p = 0.396 p = 0.030 p = 0.914 p = 0.334 p = 0.018
soc_str.comp.dlt1y −1.600 −0.205 −0.306 0.480 −0.470
p = 0.205 p = 0.801 p = 0.631 p = 0.289 p = 0.717
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 723 1,570 709 363 1,484
R2 0.054 0.092 0.028 0.014 0.036
F Statistic 3.090∗∗∗ 12.200∗∗∗ 1.550∗ 0.368 4.190∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.actual.dlt1y (variables of interest)
Table 41: Changes in realized EPS measures on changes in KLD Strengths, using
industry cross-sections (FF5).
ibes1.meanest.dlt1y
all
ibes2.meanest.dlt1y
all
ibes2.meanest.dlt12y
all
(1) (2) (3)
env_con.comp.dlt1y 0.006 −0.052 −0.059
p = 0.974 p = 0.758 p = 0.722
soc_con.comp.dlt1y −0.118 −0.076 −0.451∗∗
p = 0.589 p = 0.726 p = 0.035
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,007 5,007 5,007
R2 0.075 0.087 0.095
F Statistic 16.900∗∗∗ 19.900∗∗∗ 21.700∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.meanest.dlt1y, ibes2.meanest.dlt1y, ibes2.meanest.dlt12y (variables of interest)
Table 42: Changes in EPS forecasts on changes in KLD Concerns, using the full sam-
ple.
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ibes1.actual.dlt1y
all
env_con.comp.dlt1y 0.049
p = 0.816
soc_con.comp.dlt1y −0.789
p = 0.103
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes
Year dummies Yes
Size Yes
Shares outstanding Yes
Observations 4,849
R2 0.031
F Statistic 6.450∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.actual.dlt1y (variables of interest)
Table 43: Changes in realized EPS measures on changes in KLD Concerns, using the
full sample.
areas related to social concerns seems to filter down into accounting mea-
sures of firm performance, financial analysts are correct in taking this factor
into account when predicting future EPS.
Switching to the industry cross-sections (Table 44), the positive effect of
improved social concerns seems almost entirely driven by the Manufactur-
ing industries: analysts perceive a decrease in social concerns as having a
positive effect on future EPS. For the Other industries, however, the effect
is opposite: a decrease in social concerns seems to be perceived as an un-
necessary expenditure and thus lowering the EPS forecasts. In contrast to
the full sample results, the High Tech industries (like Computers, Electronic
Equipment or Telecoms) experience higher forecasted EPS with a decrease
in environmental concerns.
The regressions on the realized EPS (Table 45) confirms the analysts’ in-
tuitions when it comes to the Manufacturing industries: a decrease in social
concerns does indeed translate into a higher realized EPS. The same doesn’t
hold in the other two cases. For the Other industries changes in social con-
cerns don’t seem to affect the actual EPS. For High Tech industries, as well,
changes in environmental concerns don’t seem to translate into accounting
measures of financial performance. In both of these cases it would seem that
analysts take into account factors that don’t affect the financial performance
of firms in the short term.
4.3.3 Net Performance
In this section we look at the net extra-financial performance of firms (i.e.
Strengths – Concerns). For the full sample (Table 46), financial analysts don’t
seem to be taking into account changes in the net extra-financial perfor-
mance of firms when forecasting future EPS. This statistically insignificant
result is stable across all three measures of yearly changes in EPS forecasts.
The same holds for changes in the realized EPS (Table 47). Overall it
doesn’t seem like yearly changes in either net environmental or social per-
formance has any impact on the financial performance of firms based on
accounting measures.
Things stand quite differently when examining the industry cross-sections
(Table 48). For the Consumer industries, an improvement in net social perfor-
mance would be associated with lower forecasted EPS figures. For the Man-
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ibes1.meanest.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_con.comp.dlt1y −0.360 0.006 −0.366 0.031 0.005
p = 0.655 p = 0.977 p = 0.526 p = 0.922 p = 0.994
soc_con.comp.dlt1y 0.024 −0.735 −0.200 −0.398 0.755∗∗
p = 0.966 p = 0.123 p = 0.701 p = 0.196 p = 0.016
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.080 0.126 0.104 0.023 0.051
F Statistic 4.900∗∗∗ 17.700∗∗∗ 6.500∗∗∗ 0.660 6.250∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.meanest.dlt1y (variables of interest)
ibes2.meanest.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_con.comp.dlt1y −0.352 −0.182 −0.315 −0.133 0.422
p = 0.637 p = 0.341 p = 0.601 p = 0.663 p = 0.523
soc_con.comp.dlt1y 0.175 −0.766∗ −0.266 −0.530 0.802∗∗
p = 0.749 p = 0.094 p = 0.606 p = 0.136 p = 0.016
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.081 0.146 0.111 0.027 0.063
F Statistic 4.970∗∗∗ 21.100∗∗∗ 6.950∗∗∗ 0.769 7.860∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(b) ibes2.meanest.dlt1y (variables of interest)
ibes2.meanest.dlt12y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_con.comp.dlt1y −0.562 −0.104 −1.020∗ 0.214 0.318
p = 0.417 p = 0.606 p = 0.054 p = 0.338 p = 0.600
soc_con.comp.dlt1y −0.137 −1.310∗∗∗ −0.804 −0.275 0.687∗∗
p = 0.801 p = 0.002 p = 0.183 p = 0.414 p = 0.028
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.074 0.151 0.127 0.033 0.064
F Statistic 4.480∗∗∗ 21.900∗∗∗ 8.160∗∗∗ 0.927 8.060∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(c) ibes2.meanest.dlt12y (variables of interest)
Table 44: Changes in EPS forecasts on changes in KLD Concerns, using industry
cross-sections (FF5).
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ibes1.actual.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_con.comp.dlt1y −0.720 0.211 −0.273 −0.039 −0.479
p = 0.592 p = 0.399 p = 0.702 p = 0.902 p = 0.318
soc_con.comp.dlt1y −0.397 −1.520∗∗ −0.857 −0.433 −0.014
p = 0.793 p = 0.029 p = 0.510 p = 0.288 p = 0.989
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 723 1,570 709 363 1,484
R2 0.045 0.096 0.029 0.013 0.035
F Statistic 2.580∗∗∗ 12.700∗∗∗ 1.600∗ 0.358 4.140∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.actual.dlt1y (variables of interest)
Table 45: Changes in realized EPS measures on changes in KLD Concerns, using
industry cross-sections (FF5).
ibes1.meanest.dlt1y
all
ibes2.meanest.dlt1y
all
ibes2.meanest.dlt12y
all
(1) (2) (3)
env_diff.comp.dlt1y 0.028 0.022 0.059
p = 0.829 p = 0.869 p = 0.624
soc_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.100 −0.140 0.104
p = 0.552 p = 0.391 p = 0.538
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes
Observations 5,007 5,007 5,007
R2 0.075 0.087 0.094
F Statistic 16.900∗∗∗ 19.900∗∗∗ 21.500∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.meanest.dlt1y, ibes2.meanest.dlt1y, ibes2.meanest.dlt12y (variables of interest)
Table 46: Changes in EPS forecasts on changes in net KLD performance, using the
full sample.
ibes1.actual.dlt1y
all
env_diff.comp.dlt1y 0.122
p = 0.505
soc_diff.comp.dlt1y 0.362
p = 0.348
Industry dummies (FF 12) Yes
Year dummies Yes
Size Yes
Shares outstanding Yes
Observations 4,849
R2 0.031
F Statistic 6.340∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.actual.dlt1y (variables of interest)
Table 47: Changes in realized EPS measures on changes in net KLD performance,
using the full sample.
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ufacturing industries, however, an improvement in net social performance
would be associated with higher forecasted EPS figures. In this industry the
same is true, though barely significant at 10%, for net environmental perfor-
mance: an improvement in this area will result in higher EPS estimates by
financial analysts.
For the High Tech industries as well an improvement in net environmental
performance will result in higher EPS estimates. But not so for the Other
industries – an improvement in either environmental or social performance
would be perceived by financial analysts as an unnecessary expenditure by
the firm, and result in lower forecasted EPS figures.
In Table 49, it is interesting that only the changes in social performance
have the same effect on realized EPS as anticipated by the financial analysts.
For the remaining industries (Consumer, High Tech and Other), it would
seem that changes extra-financial performance doesn’t systematically trans-
late into actual changes in financial performance in firms in the short term.
This would suggest that analysts mistakenly take into account these factors
when estimating future forecasts.
4.4 concluding remarks
In this study we attempt to determine whether ESG information is being
incorporated into the financial flows of information. Using historical EPS
estimates and KLD ratings, we look into whether yearly changes in extra-
financial performance help in explaining the yearly changes in EPS forecasts
by financial analysts.
Our results suggest that overall financial analysts expect improvements
in social strengths to translate into a lower EPS in the short term, whereas
this effect isn’t detected when using realized EPS. This suggests that the an-
alysts may be wrong in their estimations when considering shifts in firms’
proactive social investments. A decrease in social concerns (i.e. an improve-
ment) is however reflected in both improved EPS forecasts and improved
actual EPS results. This would suggest that financial analysts are correct in
perceiving positive shifts in (largely exogenous) social concerns as a pos-
itive signal for the firms’ financial performance. Lastly, when considering
the firms’ net extra-financial performance these two effects seem to cancel
each other out. There seem to be important variations of these effects across
industries.
The present study could be improved in several ways. To improve the
robustness of the results it would be important include in the model speci-
fication additional firm-level controls such as past financial performance or
leverage. Future work should also consider adopting the framework of EPS
prediction models when attempting to determine whether financial analysts
take into account extra-financial information.
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ibes1.meanest.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.013 0.153 0.299 −0.204 −0.786
p = 0.979 p = 0.326 p = 0.178 p = 0.273 p = 0.155
soc_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.554∗ 0.518 −0.003 0.108 −0.561∗
p = 0.064 p = 0.176 p = 0.992 p = 0.688 p = 0.058
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.083 0.125 0.105 0.024 0.054
F Statistic 5.050∗∗∗ 17.700∗∗∗ 6.560∗∗∗ 0.669 6.620∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.meanest.dlt1y (variables of interest)
ibes2.meanest.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.001 0.220∗ 0.240 −0.084 −1.290∗∗
p = 0.998 p = 0.100 p = 0.247 p = 0.666 p = 0.036
soc_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.620∗ 0.579∗ −0.082 0.068 −0.612∗∗
p = 0.090 p = 0.098 p = 0.807 p = 0.834 p = 0.032
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.084 0.146 0.111 0.024 0.071
F Statistic 5.160∗∗∗ 21.100∗∗∗ 6.970∗∗∗ 0.687 8.900∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(b) ibes2.meanest.dlt1y (variables of interest)
ibes2.meanest.dlt12y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_diff.comp.dlt1y 0.156 0.116 0.409∗∗ −0.197 −0.833∗∗
p = 0.735 p = 0.455 p = 0.030 p = 0.241 p = 0.048
soc_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.383 0.952∗∗∗ 0.170 0.002 −0.515∗
p = 0.208 p = 0.008 p = 0.686 p = 0.995 p = 0.083
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 743 1,616 740 372 1,536
R2 0.074 0.150 0.121 0.032 0.067
F Statistic 4.450∗∗∗ 21.700∗∗∗ 7.710∗∗∗ 0.917 8.430∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(c) ibes2.meanest.dlt12y (variables of interest)
Table 48: Changes in EPS forecasts on changes in net KLD performance, using indus-
try cross-sections (FF5).
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ibes1.actual.dlt1y
Cnsmr Manuf HiTec Hlth Other
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
env_diff.comp.dlt1y 0.989 0.168 0.081 −0.052 −0.277
p = 0.393 p = 0.380 p = 0.779 p = 0.732 p = 0.442
soc_diff.comp.dlt1y −0.227 0.990∗ 0.423 0.425 −0.182
p = 0.781 p = 0.088 p = 0.667 p = 0.126 p = 0.836
Industry dummies (FF 12) No No No No No
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Shares outstanding Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 723 1,570 709 363 1,484
R2 0.050 0.094 0.028 0.014 0.035
F Statistic 2.890∗∗∗ 12.400∗∗∗ 1.560∗ 0.389 4.140∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
(a) ibes1.actual.dlt1y (variables of interest)
Table 49: Changes in realized EPS measures on changes in net KLD performance,
using industry cross-sections (FF5).
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